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RUSSIA & LEGAL HARMONIZATION: AN 
HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO IP REFORM AS 
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE  
BORIS N. MAMLYUK

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines several waves of intellectual property (IP) 
regulation reform in Russia, starting with an examination into early Soviet 
attempts to regulate intellectual property. Historical analysis is useful to 
illustrate areas of theoretical convergence, divergence, and tension 
between state ideology, positive law, and ―law in action.‖ The relevance 
of these tensions for post-Soviet legal reform may appear tenuous. 
However, insofar as IP enforcement has emerged as one of the largest 
hurdles for Russia’s prolonged accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), these historical precedents may help explain Russia’s apparent 
theoretical and political disconnect from the WTO. If Russian 
policymakers and many Western analysts agree that Russia has complied 
with all necessary structural adjustment reforms for WTO accession 
(including reforming its IP legislation), then deeper points of contention 
between Russia and the West must be identified. One point of departure, 
the Article posits, is Russia’s lingering inability to convey adherence to 
general international law.  
Thus, this Article re-conceptualizes the link between domestic and 
international legal orders by connecting the IP debate to broader debates 
over the nature of international law in the Soviet and post-Soviet space. 
Specifically, Part I examines how Soviet theorists attempted to reconcile 
IP regulation with Marxist ideology and socialist international law. Part 
II surveys the main IP law reform projects in post-Soviet Russia from 1992 
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to 2006, with particular emphasis on harmonization with global legal 
standards. The second part also provides a brief comparative analysis of 
Russia’s latest IP law (effective 2008) and copyright protections in U.S. 
law as well as the 1971 Berne Convention. The Article concludes with an 
overview of doctrinal debates within Russia over harmonization, WTO 
accession, and international law. These debates shed light on the 
development of local resistance to further legal harmonization efforts, an 
issue of immediate relevance not just for policymakers working with 
Russia, but for broader law and development debates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has Russia finally ended 
its transition and completed its restoration/reintegration into the 
international legal order? If so, has Russia developed a novel theory of 
international law or has it fully subscribed to the liberal international legal 
model? In his 2003 introduction to the second edition of G.I. Tunkin‘s 
Theory of International Law, William E. Butler, the eminent legal scholar 
of Soviet/Russian law, noted that ―[t]here is no ‗substitute‘ or 
‗replacement‘ theory, as yet, to supersede the insights into international 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/4
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behaviour identified by Academician G.I. Tunkin.‖1 Taking as granted that 
Russia has not fully adopted a liberal theory of state and law along 
Western lines, as most observers had hoped, it is worthwhile to reexamine 
the countless continuities and discontinuities between the Soviet and post-
Soviet Russian experience with international law and institutions. 
Considering Russia‘s increasingly aggressive foreign policy posture and 
growing uncertainty over the viability of domestic reforms,
2
 it is vitally 
important to take stock of these difficult—and largely unquantifiable—
aspects of Russian reforms, from the enduring legacy of great 
power/socialist/bureaucratic thinking still prevalent among Russia‘s policy 
and academic elites, to more concrete issues like Russia‘s attempt to 
project respect for property rights to potential investors.  
The present Article explores these historical breaks and continuities in 
the context of Russia‘s intellectual property reforms.3 The analysis follows 
two parts. Part I offers a brief legal history of Soviet regulation of 
intellectual property (―IP‖) rights, starting in the early 1920s when the 
Soviet state was first engineering its socialist legal system in an apparent 
attempt to break away from the global ―bourgeois‖ legal order. The first 
Part also provides an overview of the ―mature‖ or classic Soviet IP regime. 
Part II presents a synopsis of IP law reform projects in post-Soviet Russia 
and Russia‘s attempts to harmonize its IP legislation with international 
norms throughout the 1990s. Part II also compares Russia‘s subsequent IP 
law reforms to U.S. copyright law, particularly in reference to legal 
licenses or ―fair use,‖ through a traditional functionalist comparative law 
methodology.
4
 The Article concludes with a broader discussion on the 
effectiveness of Russia‘s attempts to harmonize its domestic IP system 
with international norms, including a study of resistance. This in turn 
allows an evaluation of alternative policy options or alternative normative 
 
 
1. William E. Butler, Introduction to G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xiii 
(William E. Butler trans., 2d ed. 2003). 
2. See Dmitri Trenin, Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow’s Foreign Policy, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 64; see also Boris N. Mamlyuk, Book Review, 35 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. 
L. 111 (2010) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL LAW—A RUSSIAN INTRODUCTION (Valerti I. Kuznetsov, 
Bakhtiar R. Tuzmukhamedov eds., 2009)). 
3. This Article is Chapter 6 of a larger dissertation on the development of international legal 
theory in Russia during two moments of crisis, the Interwar period (1919–1939) and the post-Soviet 
period (1989–2009).  
4. Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: 
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 104–08 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Mary Ann 
Glendon, Michael W. Gordon & Christopher Osakwe, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11–12 (2d 
ed. West 1994). On functionalism more broadly, see the classic Robert K. Merton, SOCIAL THEORY 
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 73 (1968 Enlarged Edition).  
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approaches to law reform and law and development projects not just in 
Russia, but in other transitioning states. 
I. EARLY SOVIET IP PROTECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Why Turn So Far to History? 
Most historical studies looking at IP reform in post-Soviet Russia start 
with the classic or late Soviet period (1960–1989) as a point of departure.5 
This is a useful starting place. However, the early Soviet period—the 
interwar years of 1919–1939—offers a remarkably sophisticated 
complementary analytical frame for considering the inner tensions and 
incongruities of Soviet legal theory and practice. How the Soviet Union 
came to recognize IP rights despite openly professing to oppose ―private 
property‖ (and any laws that upheld the right of ownership to the means of 
production) may shed further light on the ambiguous intellectual structures 
of Soviet law, and by legacy, the post-Soviet legal system.  
B. Lenin as IP Regulator-in-Chief? 
A core tenet of Marxism and Leninism was the abolition of private 
property over the means of production and a critique of property forms 
generally.
6
 As such, it may come as a surprise that the early Soviet state 
protected IP rights. Yet the early Soviet state was an ardent defender of 
individual and commercial right holders‘ claims both foreign and 
domestic, and not merely under the New Economic Policy which briefly 
liberalized the Soviet economy from 1922 to 1929. Lenin himself issued 
no less than a half dozen decrees on copyright and authors‘ rights 
protections between 1917 and 1922. What explains this apparent paradox? 
Did not the very notion of owning an idea or a work of art contradict the 
socialist conception of mass production and commonality of title? The 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
xv (4th revised ed. 2005). The notable exception in this regard is Michiel Elst‘s comprehensive 
historical study. See MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Martinus Nijhoff 2005); see also SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, 
DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE LEGE LATA AC FERENDA (1979). Elst and 
Levitsky, however, do not connect the history of IP regulation in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia 
with broader debates in Soviet/pre-Soviet international legal theory and practice, which is the goal of 
the present analysis.  
 6. See generally RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY (1945); EVGENY PASHUKANIS, 
LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Barbara Einhorn trans., Inklinks 1978); HANS KELSEN, 
THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW ch. 5 (1955); HUGH W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1951); 
WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY (1996). 
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answer to this question goes to the heart of the early Soviet theory of state 
and law and invokes fundamental theoretical debates that rocked the 
Soviet legal establishment throughout the interwar period. A quick survey 
of these debates is useful to contextualize the discussion that follows.  
One reason for the eruption of fierce debates regarding the nature and 
function of law following the Bolshevik Revolution was that Marx did not 
expressly formulate the contours of post-revolutionary law and the state.
7
 
Had Marx theorized law as he had intended, it is likely that the 
Bolsheviks‘ piety to his teachings would have reduced the ensuing legal 
drama to a well-managed bureaucratic transition.
8
 Absent that, it was left 
to the Bolsheviks to navigate the problems of managing a failed state 
through a series of foreign and domestic challenges while attempting to 
create consistent theoretical justification for their actions. 
The most influential application of Marxist theory to the problem of 
political reorganization following the proletarian revolution was by Lenin 
himself in his State and Revolution.
9
 Here, Lenin restated the main theses 
of Marx and Engels on the state, including the theory of class rule, 
formulated the theory of a Marxist state ruled by the proletarian class, and 
defended his conception against ―opportunists,‖ including the German 
Social-Democrats and English Fabians from the Second International. 
Lenin outlined the class nature of governments, the origins and role of the 
state, and bourgeois‘ use of class antagonism in maintaining the state.10 He 
further critiqued what he described as a petit-bourgeois illusion of gradual 
transformation of capitalism into socialism without revolution.  
 
 
 7. Marx touches upon issues of law and economic relations as a basis for law in his Critique of 
the Gotha Program. See KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (Int‘l Publ. Co., Inc. 1938) 
(1875). But he does not offer a theory of law, or a programmatic analysis of the role of law in a 
communist society.  
 8. В.В. ЛАПАЕВА, ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА В КАПИТАЛЕ МАРКСА 5–6 (Юр. Лит., 1982) 
[VALENTINA VIKTORONA LAPAEVA, QUESTIONS OF LAW IN MARX‘S CAPITAL, 5–6 (Jur. Lit. 1982)]. 
Lapaeva‘s succinct explanation of the doctrinal disagreements between eminent theorists P.I. Stuchka 
and E.B. Pashukanis, on the one hand, and I. Razumovsky, on the other, provides an excellent 
summary of the debates and is a good starting point for scholars interested in understanding the official 
post-Stalin position on Pashukanis. According to Lapaeva, Razumovsky was able to demonstrate, 
unlike Pashukanis, that abstract and concrete conceptions of the legal form did not necessarily require 
the abolition of law, since law did not encompass all relations between property owners, but rather 
represented only one aspect of economic relations. Id. at 7–9. 
 9. See ЛЕНИН, ГОСУДАРСТВО И РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ: УЧЕНИЕ МАРКСИЗМА О ГОСУДАРСТВЕ И 
ЗАДАЧИ ПРОЛЕТАРИАТА В РЕВОЛЮЦИИ (1917) (Полное собрание соч., 5 изд. т 33 с. 1–120) 
[VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (Robert Service trans., Penguin 1992)].  
 10. Lenin theorized that despite differences in form between modern bourgeois states 
(parliamentary, traditional monarchic), the dictatorship of the capital owning class (the bourgeois 
class) over the proletarian united these diverse forms.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
540 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:535 
 
 
 
 
According to Lenin, following a socialist revolution, the dictatorship of 
the proletariat would develop into a strong, centralized democratic base of 
Soviets (or workers‘ councils). The central communist party would play a 
guiding role in the construction of this socialist state by ensuring 
discipline, organization, and redistribution of material resources. Most 
importantly, Lenin developed and theorized Marx/Engel‘s writings on the 
dual phases of communism, the immediate socialist state following a 
socialist revolution, and a higher phase of communism which would 
finally see the withering away of the state. Contrary to Bukharin,
11
 Lenin 
claimed that the transition to communism could only come after 
strengthening the state administrative organs and consolidating power in 
the hands of the Soviets and the party. Furthermore, this consolidation of 
power would coincide with the development of other proletarian 
movements across the world. Thus, Lenin theorized the importance and, 
indeed, inevitability of the transition period as a political and strategic 
necessity, but also as a forceful rhetorical and argumentative tool. As we 
shall see, this formulation would serve as the basis for Korovin‘s transition 
theory of international law and all subsequent Soviet theories of 
international law until the development of the doctrine of permanent 
peaceful coexistence in 1963. This transition theory would also have a 
direct impact on the development of private law in the early Soviet state. 
Per Lenin, until the ―highest form of communism‖ arose, the party 
would need to exercise strict control over society and the state to regulate 
labor, production, and consumption.
12
 This highest form of communism 
would occur when society would overcome the differences between 
physical and mental labor, divisions of standards of living between urban 
and rural workers, and as a result of the mixing of nations (ethnicities).
13
 
In State and Revolution, Lenin did not specify the role of law in the 
transition from bourgeois order to socialism; indeed law is mentioned but 
once in a discussion of the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany.
14
 However, in 
The Proletarian Revolution in Russia, a collection of articles and speeches 
by Lenin and Trotsky, it was clear that legal control was meant to be 
 
 
 11. Н. Бухарин, K теории империалистического государства, РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 5 (Изд. 
Ком. Акад., 1925) [Nikolai Bukharin, Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State, in REVOLUTSIA 
PRAVA 5 (Communist Acad. 1925)]. To Bukharin, the post-revolutionary state existed only in a 
transitory moment and could not be strengthened after the revolution. The state apparatus had to be 
reduced in direct correlation with the elimination of classes. Id. at 13. This directly contradicted 
Lenin‘s position on the need to strengthen the communist apparatus.  
 12. LENIN, supra note 9, at 97. 
 13. Id. at 93–97.  
 14. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/4
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exercised directly by the Soviets through direct democracy.
15
 But 
immediately a theoretical crisis presented itself.  
According to Marx, the state and the law are elements of a social 
superstructure determined by the economic relations and activities (the 
base) of the ruling classes of a particular society. If the purpose of the 
Soviet state was to destroy this superstructure and replace it with a 
domestic communist order, then law should have had no function in the 
new Soviet state. In other words, because law was the manifestation of 
class struggle and reinforced class difference, the abolition of class would 
require the simultaneous abolition of law. This thesis was famously 
theorized by the early Soviet legal philosopher Evgeny Pashukanis (1891–
1937) in his 1924 General Theory of Law and Marxism.
16
 Pashukanis went 
even further than merely exposing the logical inconsistency of maintaining 
law in a classless society. He argued that since law arose as a consequence 
of property exchange, it was necessary to eliminate law in an effort to 
disrupt the cycle of property rights, commodity fetishism, and material 
relations between individuals in the new Soviet state.
17
 In short, law went 
hand in hand with property and vice versa. Only by abolishing both law 
and property could individuals rise to a higher form of social 
consciousness and political awareness.
18
  
Analogously, on the international plane, it was theoretically impossible 
for the Soviet Union to exist in a world system of law which was built by 
the bourgeois and imperialist ruling class, comprised of the powerful 
imperial nations that reached their zenith in the nineteenth century.
19
 These 
differences between socialism and capitalism were deemed a priori to be 
irreconcilable by some jurists (like Stuchka and Pashukanis).
20
 Other early 
Soviet jurists, like A.G. Goikhbarg, however, saw the potential of 
reinventing law to serve the interest of the proletarian class through the 
creation of the Bolshevik law that would administer the dictatorship of the 
 
 
 15. VLADIMIR LENIN & LEON TROTSKY, THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 83 (1918). 
 16. PASHUKANIS, supra note 6. 
 17. Id. at 109–33. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 6 (arguing that a subject under international law is identical to a subject under 
municipal law). 
 20. Id. at 52 (―Современное международное право включает в себя весьма солидную дозу 
самоуправства (реторсии, репрессалии, войны и т. д.)‖ [―Contemporary international law includes 
a solid dose of contradictory ‗self-regulation‘ (retribution, repression, war, etc.).‖]). Id. at 67 n.148 
(―[. . .] в международных отношениях государство выступает вовсе не как воплощение 
объективной нормы, но как носитель субъективных прав, т. е. со всеми атрибутами 
субстанциональности и эгоистической заинтересованности.‖ [―[. . .] in international relations, the 
state does not act as embodying objective norms, but acts as a holder of subjective rights, that is with 
all of the attributes of substantive and egoistic self-interestedness.‖]). 
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proletariat.
21
 In international law, this meant the creation of a Bolshevik 
legal order or a socialist international law governing relations between 
Socialist-dominant states and capitalist states.
22
  
Although he was an attorney who often spoke and wrote on such 
central topics as self-determination, sovereignty, non-intervention, and 
international economic law, Lenin did not participate in these core 
theoretical debates.
23
 This occurred for at least three reasons. First, as the 
chief executive of the Soviet state, Lenin was too preoccupied with more 
urgent matters of war and peace. During the first two months of Soviet 
Russia‘s existence, for instance, Lenin issued more than forty decrees 
concerning foreign relations.
24
 In the first five years (1917–1922), more 
than 270 legal acts were adopted concerning foreign relations.
25
 Second, it 
is well-known that Lenin preferred to write in populist form to emphasize 
the relevance of his theories to the working masses.
26
 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that he avoided the theoretical fights on the pages of Soviet law 
 
 
 21. A.G. Goikhbarg was the first Director of the Institute of Soviet Law from 1922 to 1925. After 
Pashukanis gained control over the Soviet legal academy in 1932, he expelled Goikhbarg from his 
teaching post for maintaining ―bourgeois‖ attachment to the notion of Soviet law. Goikhbarg was 
ultimately jailed, but rehabilitated after WWII.  
 22. ЕВГЕНИЙ А. КОРОВИН, МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО ПЕРЕХОДНОГО ВРЕМЕНИ (М., 1924) 
[EVGENY A. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (1924)]. 
 23. In fact, his writings on international law were ultimately collected and published as a 
standalone volume by the Soviet Institute of International Relations. ЛЕНИН О МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ 
ПОЛИТИКЕ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ ПРАВЕ (Изд-во Ин-та международных отношений, 1958) [LENIN 
ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL LAW (Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations 1958)]; see also V.I. LENIN, QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY (Foreign Languages Publ. 
House 1959) (devoted mainly to self-determination and related questions). In 1970, the Soviet Union 
issued a volume of Lenin‘s contributions to international law, edited by Tunkin and V.F. Fedorov. 
Г.И. Тункин, В.Ф. Федоров, ред., В.И. ЛЕНИН И СОВРЕМЕННОЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО (Москва, 
Знание 1970) [V.I. LENIN AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (G.I. Tunkin & V.F. Fedorov 
eds., Znanie 1970)]. For a short overview of Lenin‘s contributions to international law, see Г.В. 
Игнатенко, В. И. Ленин и международное право, 2 ПРАВОВЕДЕНИЕ 98–108 (1970), available at 
http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1133126 (Russian).  
 24. Н.В. МИРОНОВ, ПРАВОВОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНИХ СНОШЕНИЙ СССР (1917–1970) 7 
(ИМО, 1971) [N.V. MIRONOV, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE USSR (1917–
1970) 7 (IMO 1971)] (providing an excellent anthology of legal reforms pertaining to foreign relations 
bodies in the Soviet Union from 1917–1970). 
 25. Id. Despite his weakened physical condition, Lenin remained actively involved in executive 
decisions on matters of war and the status of the USSR in foreign relations. Lenin‘s responses to 
ongoing peace negotiations with the Central Powers, for instance, and exchanges between him, Stalin, 
and Trotsky regarding the Georgia Affair and legal status of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative 
Soviet Republic showed that he was exceptionally sensitive to how the USSR was being perceived 
abroad. Id. 
 26. П.И. Стучка, Ленин и Революционный декрет, РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 32 (Изд. Ком. Акад., 
1925) [P.I. Stuchka, Lenin and the Revolutionary Decree, REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 32 (1925)] (telling the 
anecdote that even Stuchka, despite being intimately familiar with Lenin‘s work, did not know that 
Lenin was a lawyer until the two of them were buying a printing press in Spring 1917 and Lenin 
presented his bar card to the seller).  
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journals. Third, by 1922 (when these debates began in earnest) Lenin was 
effectively incapacitated by a stroke caused by an assassin‘s bullet. Lenin 
died in January 1924 just as Pashukanis‘ and Korovin‘s main treatises 
were being published.  
For these reasons, modern historians and especially legal scholars do 
not treat Lenin‘s writings on international law seriously. However, in the 
context of a Soviet conception of international law and property, Lenin‘s 
writings are key to understanding the overarching spirit of 
pragmatism/realism, while staying true to core Marxist tenets.
27
 Lenin‘s 
influence on Soviet international law remained profound in two respects. 
First, Lenin explicitly sanctioned the idea of legal instrumentalism, or 
the notion that law needed to serve a particular policy end. Though law 
was theoretically indeterminate, unnecessary, and ultimately a bourgeois 
fiction,
28
 law and legal process were necessary to further the cause of 
communism in the immediate transition period. This methodology directly 
influenced an entire generation of pre-WWII and post-war Soviet jurists. 
Indeed, legal instrumentalism (and perhaps, exceptionalism) in 
international law would go on to be the Soviets‘ most enduring 
contribution to mainstream international law.
29
 Second, how early Soviet 
jurists rationalized and justified radical departures from Marxist doctrine 
to carry out diametrically opposed policy reforms sheds light on the 
Soviets‘ particular sensibility, or mentalité, concerning law. 
Understanding this intellectual dynamic can explain not just how Soviets 
wanted to have their cake and eat it too, that is to say, how Soviet law on 
the books differed from ―law in action.‖ More importantly, by unpacking 
why and how Soviet Russia betrayed its avowed ideals in exchange for 
tangible benefits (recognition, material aid, so on), we can better 
 
 
 27. After WWII, scholars attempted to systematize Marx‘s and Lenin‘s writings on international 
law. Notable among these was Tunkin‘s 1970 work. Г.И. Тункин, В.Ф. Федоров, В.И. Ленин и 
современное международное право, 2 ГОСУДАРСТВО И ПРАВО (1970) [G.I. Tunkin, V.F. Fedorov, 
V.I. Lenin and Contemporary International Law, 2 STATE AND LAW (1970)]; В.Ф. Губин, Карл 
Маркс и международное право, 2 ГОСУДАРСТВО И ПРАВО (1969) [V.F. Gubin, Karl Marx and 
International Law, 2 STATE AND LAW (1969)]. These journals are not to be confused with the separate 
periodical of the Institute of State and Law, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo.  
 28. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Yale 1922). The parallel 
between Pound‘s policy-oriented sociological jurisprudence and early socialist legal theory 
(representative of early Soviet legal realism and American legal realism, respectively) are 
underresearched and deserve greater scrutiny. For one move in this direction, see generally MICHAEL 
HEAD, PASHUKANIS: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (2004); Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A 
Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949). 
 29. Contemporary scholars trace the theoretical roots of exceptionalism to Carl Schmitt, but 
Evgeny Korovin‘s 1924 International Law of the Transition Period arguably influenced Schmitt to a 
greater extent than has been previously understood. See KOROVIN, supra note 22. 
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understand how the very notions of law, legality, and socialist justice, 
were co-opted, made indeterminate, and ultimately served as nothing but 
rhetorical gestures.
30
 Two historical moments illustrate how the early 
Soviet Union came to recognize and protect intellectual property rights 
while being ostensibly opposed to law, property, and like ―bourgeois 
notions.‖ First, there was the need to attract foreign trade and project 
respect for foreign property rights pursuant to international obligations. 
Second, this need for property protection was internalized into the 
domestic legal order.  
1. The Dilemma of Attracting Foreign Trade (Pragmatism & 
International Law) 
Modern histories of early Soviet law neglect the economic constraints 
that molded Soviet international legal practice, instead focusing on major 
events such as Russia‘s negotiations of the many peace treaties with WWI 
adversaries and later accession into the League of Nations and subsequent 
expulsion therefrom. Most scholars list historical and political reasons as 
lying at the root of Soviet preference for a classic conception of 
international law (strict sovereignty, anti-monism, etc.).
31
 In international 
relations, the early years of the Bolshevik state (1918–1920) are 
commonly seen as when the Soviets developed a foreign policy based on 
expediency and an ad hoc application of Marxist principles in relations 
with imperialist states to gain recognition and political legitimacy.  
But economic realities had a more direct influence on the shaping of 
Soviet notions of international law and the place of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (―USSR‖) vis-à-vis the capitalist states. Even hardline 
Marxist legal theorists like Pashukanis acknowledged how profoundly 
material conditions would affect the development of Soviet international 
legal doctrine. As Pashukanis wrote in his brief entry on ―peaceful 
blockades,‖ the Allies, having realized that the Bolsheviks had defeated 
the counter-revolutionaries, lifted their blockade of Soviet Russia on 
January 16, 1920 because it was an economic necessity for them to trade 
 
 
 30. Following Prof. Butler, this mentalité, in turn, may bear directly on how contemporary 
Russian jurists approach law. See Butler, Introduction, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 31. See, e.g., GEORGE GINSBURGS, FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STUDIES IN 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1998); TARJA LANGSTROM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Emanuel Margolis, Certain Aspects of the Impact of Communism on 
International Law at 5–13 (Mar. 1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
Department of Government).  
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with Russia.
32
 Pashukanis was not unique in situating core theoretical 
disagreements with bourgeois international lawyers in a broader context of 
trade relations and material conditions, although his position is remarkable 
in that he framed the discourse in such a way that it appeared the West 
needed to compromise with the USSR, rather than vice versa. However, 
prior to any official recognition of the USSR under international law, it 
was the Soviet Union rather than bourgeois states that was seeking foreign 
trade. According to Korovin, ―[b]y 1921, after the final act of the foreign 
intervention in the Russian civil war, and the final defeat of Wrangel in 
1919–1920, the Soviet Union shifted to negotiations and began seeking 
compromises and business relationships.‖33 This is not splitting hairs. 
Since as both Korovin and Pashukanis claimed that material conditions 
determined the substance of international law, it is important to understand 
correctly the material conditions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (―RSFSR‖) and how this affected doctrinal developments.  
In fact, despite the high-flying rhetoric of worker‘s councils, global 
revolution, and the withering away of law, property, and state, by the early 
1920s, the territory of the former Russian empire lay in economic ruin.
34
 
By 1919, as a consequence of the Great War, the Revolution, the ensuing 
Civil War, a blockade, the armed allied intervention, and Bolshevik 
agricultural policies, the Russian economy had essentially flatlined.
35
 In 
 
 
 32. Е. Пашуканис, Мирная Блокада, ЭНЦИКЛОПЕДИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВА И ПРАВА, т. 2, 1002, 
1003 (1925–1926) [Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Peaceful Blockade, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATE AND LAW, 
v. 2, 1002, 1003 (1925–1926)].  
 33. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 60. 
 34. It is generally agreed that the material situation worsened precipitously from 1917 to 1922. In 
Socialist and Imperialist Diplomacy, Chicherin‘s report to the Fifth Congress in July 1918, he remarks 
that the goal of Soviet foreign policy was staying on the ―revolutionary offensive‖ while coping with 
the ―unbelievable deterioration‖ from the effects of the Great War and Tsarism. LENIN & TROTSKY, 
THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 409–10 (1918). Furthermore, this was a period of intense 
violence and uncertainty in Russia, not only among the general population but also in the diplomatic 
corps. The assassination of the German ambassador, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, on April 23, 1918 
shortly after his arrival in Moscow, presented a very real legitimacy challenge for the Soviet state. Id. 
at 410. Economic historians, politicians and literary figures also paint a grim tale regarding Russia‘s 
economy during this period. See АЛЕКСЕЙ ТОЛСТОЙ, ХОЖДЕНИЕ ПО МУКАМ (РОМАН ТРИЛОГИЯ), 
КНИГА 3: ХМУРОЕ УТРО (1922–1941) [ALEKSEY TOLSTOY, THE ORDEAL (NOVEL TRILOGY), BOOK 3: 
BLEAK MORNING (1922–1941)] (describing the social conditions in Russia in the historical period 
following the Soviet revolution). This image is strikingly similar to Josef Koudelka‘s famous photo of 
Prague‘s Wenceslas Square, nearly empty at noon on August 21, 1968, during the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
 35. Nikolay Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period (1920), in THE POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (K.J. Tarbuck ed., 1979); NIKOLAY BUKHARIN, IMPERIALISM 
AND WORLD ECONOMY (Howard Fennig ed., 1966); Charles Noble Gregory, The International Labor 
Organization of the League of Nations, 15 AM. J. INT‘L L. 42, 49 (1921) (―The Soviet press shows 
that, excluding railroad employees, workers in industry decreased 2,402,000 men up to January, 1919, 
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addition, as a result of droughts and crop failures in 1920, Russia 
encountered a major famine in 1921.
36
  
With the failure of communist revolutions in Europe, by 1922 it 
became clear that ―the building of socialism or communism involved 
industrialization,‖ or a surrender to the hostile capitalists encircling 
Russia.
37
 On the domestic front, Lenin masterminded the famous (and 
domestically controversial)
38
 New Economic Policy (―NEP‖) program, 
issued by decree on March 21, 1921, to revive the economy.
39
 Yet a lesser-
known aspect of NEP was its focus on reviving international trade, 
particularly with respect to exports of grain and raw materials and imports 
of industrial machinery. Just as international trade presented a strategic 
dilemma—restarting international trade meant cooperating with the same 
hostile capitalists the Bolsheviks had so fiercely opposed—the 
contradictions between NEP and Marxist theory could not have been 
greater.  
As a further strain on the tensions between Marxist theory and actual 
Soviet policies, in 1921 the Soviet Union began praying for material 
sustenance from the ―capitalist‖ West to relieve the effects of the famine.40 
Then, as now, the United States was one of the first states to respond. By 
summer 1921, the American Relief Administration (―ARA‖), headed by 
Herbert Hoover, began delivering medical supplies and foodstuffs, along 
 
 
and a report of the Supreme Council of Popular Economy of March, 1919, states that production in the 
greater number of Russian industries has decreased 400 to 500 per cent.‖). 
 36. FRANK ALFRED GOLDER & LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, ON THE TRAIL OF THE RUSSIAN FAMINE 
(Stanford 1927); see also WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA: THE PASSAGES OF FRANK 
GOLDER, 1914–1927 89 (Terence Emmons & Bertrand M. Patenaude eds., Hoover Press 1992) 
[hereinafter WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA] (describing drought in 1920–1921 and the 
major famine in Russia stretching from the Volga valley and into southern Ukraine).  
 37. ALEC NOVE, ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND SOVIET POLITICS; OR, WAS STALIN REALLY 
NECESSARY? 21 (1964).  
 38. The NEP enveloped and called into question the core premises of the Bolshevik revolution, 
including the protection of private property, land reform, and accommodation of the bourgeois 
merchant class. 
 39. Some Russian sources place this event on March 23, 1921. The decree ―On the Replacement 
of Prodrazvyorstka [Foodstuffs Requisition] by Prodnalog [Foodstuffs Tax]‖ was issued on March 21, 
1921. See Декрет ВЦИК, принятий на основе решения Х съезда РКП(б) ―О замене разверстки 
натуральным налогом‖ (21 марта 1921 г.), available at http://www.hrono.info/dokum/prod_nal.html 
(last accessed Oct. 25, 2011); see also Речь Владимира Ильича Ленина «О продовольственном 
налоге или о продналоге и о свободном обмене хлебных излишков» [V.I. Lenin, On Foodstuff 
Tax and/or Free Exchange of Excess Wheat Production (Mar. 21, 1921), speech], available at http:// 
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/Lenin_-_About_Natural_Tax.ogg. 
 40. In July 1921, writer Maxim Gorky (at the behest of Lenin) issued an appeal to ―all honest 
citizens‖ to send food and medical supplies to Soviet Russia. 
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with private aid from workers unions and individuals.
41
 On August 20, 
1921, in response to Gorky‘s call for aid, the ARA and the Soviet 
government signed the Riga Agreement, which stipulated that the ARA 
had the ―right to control its relief operations inside Russia in exchange for 
a vow to not mix with Soviet politics.‖42 Similar agreements were signed 
with the German Red Cross organizations and other states‘ relief 
organizations.
43
 But it was U.S. aid that attracted particular interest and ire 
from the Soviets.  
On the one hand, the ARA aid humiliated the Bolsheviks, who not only 
resented the notion of imperialists ―bailing out‖ socialists, but were also 
uneasy about a foreign organization with a sizeable local staff operating 
throughout much of the country.
44
 The suspicion was shared, though it was 
ultimately resolved to mutual benefit.
45
 As a matter of international law, 
Korovin was also alarmed by relief organizations‘ claims to extraterritorial 
 
 
 41. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra note 36. Golder, an archivist and Director 
of the Hoover Library at Stanford University, travelled extensively throughout revolutionary Russia. 
He also served on the American Relief Administration, formerly a government aid agency, but by that 
time a private relief organization headed by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. Id. at ix–
xxvi. 
 42. Id. at 90 (citing HAROLD H. FISHER, THE FAMINE IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1919–1923: THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (1927)). Archival records reveal the vast 
scope of the ARA operation:  
The initial plan was for the ARA to feed two to three million children, but the mission rapidly 
expanded to include adults and medical relief as well. The major leap forward came on 
December 22, 1921, when President Warren Harding signed into law a congressional 
appropriation of $20 million for the purchase of corn and seed grain from U.S. farmers for 
Russian relief. To this total other government and private U.S. contributions were added (as 
well as a Soviet government expenditure of nearly $12 million from its gold reserve); in the 
end the two-year ARA program amounted to more than $60 million. 
Id. 
 43. TIMOTHY A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (Macmillan 
1935). 
 44. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra note 36, at 90; see also KOROVIN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 63 (recalling negotiations with 
―representatives of the International Red Cross, and with personal friends of the American president, 
vacationing billionaires, and commercial groups‖). This resentment echoes Russia‘s post-2000 turn 
against the foreign aid establishment.  
 45. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra note 36, at 90.  
The ARA mission was headed by a career army officer, Colonel William N. Haskell, most of 
whose U.S. staff had served in the American Expeditionary Force. Many men had attended 
some of the finest U.S. colleges and universities and had had experience with the ARA in 
Europe. They were eager to tackle the Russian job with trademark ARA drive and efficiency 
and had little tolerance for Soviet inefficiency and suspicion; they especially resented the 
network of Red Army commissars and agents of the secret police set up to monitor their 
activities. There were many ARA-Soviet confrontations over issues big and small, but each 
was somehow resolved through diplomacy. In the end the Soviet government officially 
acknowledged the ARA‘s contribution in checking the famine and saving millions of lives.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction and wrote at length about the need to limit the legal status of 
foreign charitable organizations operating in the Soviet Union. Writing in 
the first volume of the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, for instance, Korovin 
stressed the importance of limiting the rights of foreign organizations 
operating on Soviet soil, while recognizing the need to set reasonable 
permissions to aid famine relief efforts.
46
  
On the other hand, NEP and foreign aid programs in the early 1920s 
certainly worked, as evidenced by the increase in international trade and 
betterment of material conditions in Russia during that period. Between 
the years 1921 and 1925, for instance, trade with the United States 
quadrupled.
47
 During this time, the USSR also entered into a large number 
of bilateral treaties with European states to normalize trade relations.
48
 
Each of these agreements stipulated that the USSR would honor foreign 
investors‘ property rights on its territory, in sharp break from the 
nationalization decrees issued in the immediate aftermath of the 
Revolution.
49
 To facilitate this process, between 1922 and 1924, the Soviet 
diplomatic apparatus was restructured to avoid conflicts between the 
consular representatives abroad and the foreign trade representatives 
working under the People‘s Commissariat of Foreign Trade 
(―NarKomVneshTorg‖).50 Ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
Soviet agricultural and industrial production returned to pre-war (pre-
 
 
 46. Е.А. Коровин, Иностраная филантропическая деятельность в РСФСР и ее правовые 
формы, 1(1) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 108 (1922) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Foreign Philanthropic Activity in 
the RSFSR and its Legal Forms, 1(1) SOVIET LAW 108 (1922)]. In his International Law of the 
Transition Period, he was more direct: ―A charitable organization—[such as the Red Cross]—claiming 
universality over territorial sovereignty of nations is the same legal nonsense as the attempt of a 
corporation to claim rights under family law.‖ KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD, supra note 22, at 35. 
 47. The United States and Soviet Russia signed a ―Memorandum on Trade‖ in January 1921. See 
JOHN SPARGO, MEMORANDUM ON TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA: SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1921). These estimates are tentative because 
significant portions of the increased trade were relief shipments by the United States. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, COMMERCE REPORTS, VOL. 4, at 561 (Oct. to Dec., 
1922). In March 1921, the RSFSR also extended the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 
1921, though disputes with Great Britain over the Wrangell Islands and the intervention led to a slight 
decrease in trade in 1923.  
 48. TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 143–50. 
 49. Id. 
 50. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 69 
(discussing the purpose of the Soviet consulates as being limited to: ―(a) protection of economic and 
legal interests of the RSFSR; (b) official representation of RSFSR and other Soviet organs in the given 
states; (c) the protection of interests—economic, legal and social—of citizens of the RSFSR and its 
legal entities and firms‖) (emphasis added).  
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1913) levels.
51
 By 1930, Soviet administrators and scholars openly prided 
themselves on the exponential increase in trade with European powers and 
with the United States during the 1920s.
52
  
The benefits of these bilateral trade treaties, of course, flowed both 
ways. From the Soviet side, the treaties were conditioned on explicit 
recognition of the Soviet state under international law.
53
 Therefore, the 
USSR acquired significant leverage and legitimacy from initiating trade 
relations. In turn, the bilateral treaties of commerce provided Western 
European powers and U.S. firms with access to Russian goods and 
concessions. In essence, the bilateral trade agreements provided most-
favored nation guarantees, ―either in its absolute form, or under the form 
of a conditional (compensational) favoredness, occasionally giving way to 
preferential regulations more or less extensive in scope.‖54 Two concrete 
examples—the issue of concessions and foreign debt—show the extent to 
which Soviet leaders bowed to foreign pressure during this time. This, in 
turn, helps to contextualize the IP reforms in the crucial early years of the 
Soviet state.  
Concessions. Prior to 1928, the Soviet Union recognized three forms of 
foreign involvement in the Soviet economy: (1) direct concessions;  
(2) foreign investment in Soviet firms established pursuant to Soviet law; 
(3) operation of foreign firms on Soviet soil.
55
 With the start of the first 
 
 
 51. Boris Skvirsky, Russia’s Internal Situation and Foreign Policy—Russian-American Trade 
Relations, 138 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97, 99 (1928). Skvirsky‘s official title before the 
restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and U.S.S.R. was that of Director of the 
Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington D.C. Id. at 97. 
 52. Т. Шкловский, Вопросы организации внешней и внутриней торговли, 7 СОВЕТСКОЕ 
ГОС. И РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 74 (1930) [T. Shklovsky, Questions of Organization of Internal and 
Foreign Trade, 7 Sov. Gos. i Revolutsia Prava 74 (1930)]. Shklovsky‘s article contains useful data on 
Soviet private, public, and cooperative foreign trade during the period 1923 to 1929.  
 53. See TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 258–60. Taracouzio, however, incorrectly dates the first 
of the economic agreements between the USSR and Western Powers as being the March 16, 1921 
agreement between the USSR and Great Britain. In actuality, the US-Soviet Memorandum on Trade 
dated January 1921 was the first, though Taracouzio is correct that the Soviet-British agreement served 
as the model for the subsequent treaties with European powers. These treaties included, inter alia, 
Provisional Agreement with Germany of May 6, 1921; Provisional Agreement with Norway of 
September 2, 1921; Treaty of December 7, 1921 with Austria; Provisional Agreement with Italy of 
December 26, 1921; Provisional Agreement with Sweden of March 1, 1922; Provisional Treaty with 
Czechoslovakia of June 5, 1922; Agreement with Denmark of April 23, 1923. Id. 
 54. Evgeny A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22 AM. J. INT‘L L. 753, 754 
(1928). By ―compensational favoredness,‖ Korovin meant the right of the Soviet state to apply 
preferential regulations to commerce ―with the border states, forming, prior to 1917, part of the 
Russian Empire . . . .‖ Id. at 756. This theme of regional trade preferences for the near-abroad is 
strikingly similar to recent regional integration efforts by the Russian Federation.  
 55. М. Плоткин, Права иностранцев на современном этапе, 3 СОВЕТСКОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО 
75 (1934) [M. Plotkin, The Rights of Foreigners at the Current Stage, 3 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO 
75 (1934)]. 
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five-year plan (1928–1933), the Soviet Union did not award a single 
additional concession, and sought to restrict existing concessions on the 
basis of special agreements by purchasing remainder rights from the 
holders.
56
 The remaining concessions were insignificant. According to 
Soviet sources, private industry at the end of the first five-year plan 
represented only 0.07% of the Soviet industrial output.
57
 Similarly, joint 
stock companies founded in the USSR with foreign capital during the NEP 
period were progressively liquidated. During the first five year period, no 
additional joint stock companies with foreign capital were formed.
58
 The 
decrees of the Central Executive Committee, dated March 11, 1931, also 
slightly liberalized the rules pertaining to foreign firms and their 
representatives operating in the Soviet Union. Pursuant to Article 12 of 
this decree, firms engaged in negotiations with Soviet trade representatives 
in Russia no longer had to register and apply for licenses prior to entering 
into negotiations.
59
  
The Soviet international law establishment was fully engaged in 
support of foreign trade. This is evident not only in the spirit of doctrinal 
writings such as Korovin‘s dispatches to the American Journal of 
International Law, but also in calls for substantive reforms to existing 
treaties and trade agreements. For instance, by 1930–1931, the Soviet legal 
academy was mobilized in opposition to a new round of trade tariffs from 
the United States. Within months of the announcement of Article 307 of 
the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (prohibiting the importation of goods made 
with forced labor), Soviet international lawyers produced a series of 
articles critiquing the trade law on general political, as well as substantive, 
grounds.
60
 The expectation of continued growth in foreign trade during the 
second five-year plan also required changes in the constitutions of the 
individual Soviet republics. Extensive protections were afforded to foreign 
enterprises and their employees operating on Soviet soil. For instance, 
pursuant to an instruction of the Central Executive Committee dated 
 
 
 56. Id. at 76. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 77 (discussing liquidation proceedings against the companies Ratao and Sovpoltorg). 
 59. Id. at 77. 
 60. Экономичиская борьба капиталистических стран против СССР, 3 СОВЕТСКОЕ ГОС. И 
РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 113, 117 (1931) [Economic Warfare of the Capitalist States Versus the Soviet 
Union, 3 SOV. GOS. I REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 113, 117 (1931)] (proposing the existence of covert 
economic warfare against the early Soviet Union). Raevich also published an article disputing the 
American allegations that Soviet goods were produced with forced labor. Id. at 127.  
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October 3, 1930, foreign workers were granted all formal political rights, 
including the right to vote.
61
  
Foreign Debt. Another external constraint shaping Soviet attitudes on 
foreign relations and domestic legal reform was the large foreign debt 
owed to the United States, France, and England, which the Soviet Union 
inherited from the Tsarist and Kerensky governments.
62
 The original 
position of the RSFSR was to revoke all debt obligations to Europe and 
the United States on the basis that these debts were neither incurred by the 
toiling masses nor on their behalf.
63
 However, debt negotiations formed a 
major part of early Soviet diplomatic efforts with the West, as evidenced 
by Chicherin‘s report of October 28, 1921 and the report of January 
1922.
64
 These notes show that Soviet leaders could not sustain their 
opposition to the debt, as the issue became a major bargaining point of the 
Western powers towards the USSR. In response, the Soviet delegations 
slowly gave way on these issues. First, they acknowledged several 
important distinctions between classes of debt. Pre-1914 debt was 
acknowledged as possibly valid because it was issued for the purpose of 
developing Russia‘s economy, whereas post-1914 debt was issued to 
sustain the imperial war effort.
65
 Moreover, the Soviet Union countered 
with a number of offsets, consisting of two classes of claims: (1) for ―[t]he 
value of Russian assets situated abroad‖; and (2) for the value of ―damages 
resulting from the Allied intervention . . . .‖66 By 1925, the Soviet 
government agreed to pay outstanding debts to European states by 
modifying a number of terms, including reduction of the amounts of the 
debt.
67
 The outstanding debt owed to the United States, however, remained 
unsettled.  
Diplomatic notes show the debt to have been a major point of 
contention between the United States and the Soviet Union well into the 
mid-1930s. In addition to setting debt repayment as a precondition for 
 
 
 61. Plotkin, supra note 55, at 78. The favorable treatment of foreign workers (including 
government subsidies) was meant to demonstrate the equitable work conditions of the Soviet state. 
Indeed, according to one Soviet scholar, the only distinction between foreign workers and Soviet 
citizens was simply the conception of ―foreignness‖—the existence of which was, again, necessitated 
by capitalist encirclement. Id. 
 62. KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND 
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 95–97 (Sitjhoff 1970).  
 63. The unilateral revocation of all outstanding debts was announced by Lenin in a decree on 
January 21/February 3, 1918. International Law Reports, 162.  
 64. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 62, at 95–96.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 96. 
 67. Id. 
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recognition of the USSR, the United States set the following requirements 
for the USSR to: (1) reject its call for a world revolution and cease 
propaganda activities; (2) reverse its decree regarding the annulment of 
international debt obligations (not just United States);
68
 and (3) agree to 
recognize its international obligations (generally).
69
 The last point—the 
agreement to recognize general principles of international law—related 
directly to respect for foreign property rights on the Soviet territory, an 
issue of central importance to the present discussion. The initial Soviet 
response was flippant: the Soviet Union did not need any legal or de facto 
recognition from the West.
70
 However, this posture was disingenuous, as 
the Soviet Union certainly sought recognition from the United States, and 
the Soviets were expending great diplomatic efforts to win U.S. 
recognition.
71
  
In international law, Korovin justified the Soviet debt annulment by 
reference to his class/transition theory—essentially arguing that the Soviet 
social revolution created a radically new legal form that was qualitatively 
different from other states.
72
 Korovin admitted that ordinarily any 
successor state was bound by the legal and financial obligations of its 
predecessor, but refused to acknowledge the Soviet debt on the basis of 
communist principles. Diplomatic history and the facts of the actual debt 
service by the Soviet state reveal a slightly different story.  
First, it is important to understand that the Soviet state initially 
continued to service (pay interest on) the debt, even following the decree 
on annulment.
73
 This supports the theory that the Soviet Union sought to 
 
 
 68. The debt was partly due to the enormous increase in Russian-American trade (primarily 
exports from the United States to Russia during WWI). See GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECISION TO 
INTERVENE 323–24 (Princeton 1958) (discussing the influence of private American interests on the 
decision to intervene, including American-Russian Chamber of Commerce composed of bankers (A.B. 
Hepburn), industrialists and ―[t]hirty to forty other firms‖). 
 69. Id. at 20. 
 70. Id. 
 71. This position is surprising because the Soviet Union had worked exceedingly hard at gaining 
recognition of European powers. The stance vis-à-vis the United States may have been a negotiating 
tactic, but it certainly did not resemble the prior negotiation efforts.  
 72. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 30.  
 73. Interestingly, in 1987 a class action case was decided in which a firm sued the Soviet Union 
in a U.S. district court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (―FSIA‖) to recover part of the 
debt ($75 million, representing a $25 million issue in 1916 and a $50 million issue by the Tsarist 
government in 1917). See Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d per 
curiam, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988). The court denied the claim, 
holding that the FSIA would not apply retroactively to the Imperial-era bond issue. Carl Marks & Co., 
665 F. Supp. at 337. After reviewing case law, the court also held that as late as 1926, the USSR (like 
any foreign sovereign) would have expected absolute immunity from suit in the United States. Id. at 
339. The USSR had a justified expectation that it would not be retroactively sued in the United States. 
The case is noteworthy for its succinct retelling of the relevant facts of the debt issue. Id. at 324–32. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] RUSSIAN IP REFORM 553 
 
 
 
 
project adherence to international norms and bilateral agreements even 
when they ran counter to the professed ideology.
74
 Perhaps more 
importantly, servicing the debt intended to signal that the Soviets would be 
reliable members of the international community and good faith trade 
partners despite theoretical squabbles with the West. For the following 
fifteen years, while the Soviet Union publicly espoused Korovin‘s 
position—arguing that the debt was not legally binding on the USSR, as it 
was carried out contrary to the wishes of the proletarian class—Soviet 
diplomats privately emphasized that the debt would be settled and that the 
USSR would fully comply with all international obligations.
75
  
On November 16, 1933, the Soviet state publicly agreed to repay the 
debt in exchange for recognition by the U.S. and being allowed to join the 
League of Nations. To save face and maintain theoretical consistency, the 
debt settlement agreement between President Roosevelt and the USSR 
People‘s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov did not expressly 
stipulate that the USSR would repay debt incurred by the Kerensky 
government. Rather, the agreement employed a creative legal device 
(which came to be known as the Litvinov Assignment). The USSR would 
pay $9 million in pre-inflation money to the United States in exchange for 
an assignment of all claims, including those due it as the successor of prior 
governments of Russia, ―on condition that it be notified of any recovery by 
the United States on such claims.‖76  
Why did the USSR agree to repay the obligation when most historians 
agree that it could have chosen not to recognize the debt?
77
 Unclassified 
diplomatic dispatches between then-U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Joseph 
Davies and the U.S. State Department shed light upon the matter.
78
 On the 
topic of debt owed to the United States, Ambassador Davies stressed the 
symbolic significance to the Russians of repayment. The amount of the 
loan itself was, in the words of Davies,  
 
 
 74. Interest was paid on the remaining three installments of the bond certificates on July 10, 
1918, January 10, 1919, and July 10, 1920. Id. at 326. Interest was also paid on the bearer bond 
coupons due on June 1, 1918, December 1, 1918, and June 1, 1918 [sic]. Id.  
 75. U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to Political Relations Between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, The National Archives of the United States 1934 [Cornell Library Microfilm, 
Film 5863, Roll 1] (containing diplomatic dispatches from Joseph Davies, U.S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union) [hereinafter Davies].  
 76. Carl Marks & Co., 665 F. Supp. at 326–27. For a discussion of similar claims against the 
Soviets, see Alexander Nahum Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918–1938), N.Y.U. 
LAW Q. REV. 507 (1938). 
 77. The amount of the indebtedness was approximately $200 million in 1933 dollars (when it 
was settled for $9 million). The original amount was approximately $75 million from two issues. It 
was held in bearer bonds and credit participation certificates.  
 78. See Davies, supra note 75. 
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of relative unimportance of the matter to the United States and the 
supreme importance to the Russian people of having in the future a 
body of liberal public opinion in the United States sympathetic to 
the Russian people, particularly in view of the uncertain 
international situation [the threat of war].
79
  
Indeed, since by the early 1930s the Soviet Union began to seriously 
contemplate the threat from fascist regimes; paying off the minor debt in 
an effort to curry favor with the significantly more powerful U.S. 
government seemed to have been a reasonable step toward balancing the 
deteriorating relationship with Germany. This was all the more true 
because by 1933, Stalin‘s position was sufficiently entrenched to the 
extent that he would not really lose political capital domestically for 
settling the debt issue. In any event, it is clear from the negotiations that 
―it was a serious matter to [Russia] to retain the confidence of the [U.S.] 
government in the performance of the [debt settlement] agreement . . . .‖80 
One can surmise several other likely motivations. First, Soviet leaders 
began to realize the immense economic potential of trading with the U.S. 
and other developed countries in order to further accelerate 
industrialization. Second, with Soviet acquisition of Ford automobile and 
tractor manufacturing plants, metal refineries, and general technical know-
how, measurable progress in the manufacturing sector meant moving away 
from the status of a raw material exporter. The Soviets thereby improved 
global standing and gave greater support to the possibility of ―socialism in 
one country.‖81  
The subjective element in the debt negotiations should also be noted. 
As Davies remarked, the Soviet diplomats went out of their way to 
impress upon him (with personal guarantees and gestures) that the Soviet 
Union would pay the debt. Likewise, Davies, in both his official and 
personal capacities, made a great deal of the humanitarian similarities 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his words:  
[The U.S.] did have a great body of humanitarian democratic 
thought which did have great influence upon world opinion among 
liberal minded men everywhere which might be of inestimable 
 
 
 79. Id. at 15.  
 80. Id. at 63–64. 
 81. Of the over 2,500 treaties that Soviet Russia concluded during the first forty year period of its 
existence (1917–1957), the majority concerned economic problems and questions, chiefly matters of 
trade and commerce. See JAN F. TRISKA & ROBERT M. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF 
SOVIET TREATIES 4–5 (1962) (providing an excellent overview of Soviet treaty practice during early 
Soviet period). 
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value to Russia at some point in the future; and that speaking as a 
friend of the humanitarian impulses and purposes of the Russian 
people, personally I felt compelled to say that in my opinion it 
would be a great pity if a cloud were to be permitted by the Soviet 
government to dim the confidence which my government might 
have in the integrity and character of the men who were running 
affairs here; that this was particularly true in my opinion because 
there was no leadership of any of the great nations of the earth that 
viewed with as much sympathy the fundamental humanitarian 
purposes of the Russian people to the degree that President 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull did; that it would be too bad if 
a condition were to be permitted by the Soviet government to exist 
which would dampen or destroy their confidence in the integrity of 
leadership; that financial credits and business considerations in 
importance faded into nothing in contrast with this matter of the 
principle involved. [The Soviet Union] is producing enormous 
agricultural and mineral wealth annually, and it will not be 
dependent upon import or export for many years to come. . . . While 
there is no question but what, in its present phase, its efficiency 
cannot compare with capitalist states and possibly never will, 
nevertheless, in the absence of competition or necessity for 
competition with capitalist states, such inefficiencies need not and 
will not appear.
82
  
From the Soviet side, Marshal of the USSR and staunch Stalin ally 
Kliment Voroshilov
83
 agreed that the financial amount involved ―was 
relatively small‖ and urged to settle the matter on ―big broad, general 
principles and that a way should be found, that he appreciated the 
greatness of the President of the United States.‖84 Aside from subjective 
factors,
85
 Voroshilov and Litvinov‘s desire to see the debt matter settled on 
 
 
 82. Davies, supra note 75, at 64. 
 83. Voroshilov was appointed People‘s Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman 
of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a post he held until 1934, when he was elevated to 
Marshal of the Soviet Union.  
 84. Davies, supra note 75, at 64 (Moscow, February 18, 1937—Dispatch No. 68 [Ambassador 
Davies to Secretary of State Hull]). 
 85. There are many such factors in the diplomatic notes, and they call for a critical 
reexamination, both generally, as well as part of a ―rehabilitation,‖ so-to-speak, of Davies who was 
branded ―too soft‖ on the Communists by critics. For instance, it is noteworthy to observe the near-
obsequiousness of the Soviet leaders in their interactions with Davies. In one example, President 
Kalinin warned Ambassador Davies of superficial snap judgments of Russia, ―A visitor might see 
some drunkenness on the streets of Moscow and therefore draw the conclusion that all Russians are 
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―broad principles‖ was highly consistent with the body of Soviet treaty 
practice that had developed by that time. This can be summarized as 
follows:  
(1) Protection of foreign property rights in the USSR via bilateral 
trade agreements; 
(2) Diplomatic assurances that the USSR treated investment and 
property claims as apolitical ―administrative‖ issues governed by 
private international law;  
(3) Increasing emphasis that competition with ―bourgeois‖ states 
was a matter of ideological difference, rather than an actual political 
posture.
86
  
Of the three, the most important vehicle for the promotion of foreign trade 
was projecting a predictable treaty regime. But demonstrating the strength 
of domestic property rights regimes and enforcement mechanisms was a 
close corollary.  
Korovin wrote extensively on this subject in his treatises and journal 
articles.
87
 In his International Law of the Transition Period, for instance, 
he emphasized that treaties were the sole source of international law and 
were sacrosanct in Soviet practice (though not in theory).
88
 In his 1927 
article on treaties, he explained that treaties formed a backbone of Soviet 
foreign practice and were inviolable, save to further advance the cause of 
communism.
89
 The Soviet diplomatic corps was instructed to emphasize 
that the Soviet Union, in addition to rejecting secret diplomacy, had never 
violated a single treaty. Aside from projecting a predictable treaty regime 
and respect for international norms to attract investment, the Soviet Union 
also incorporated international customary and conventional law on the 
 
 
drunkards, which, of course, was not the fact.‖ Id. at 28 (Moscow, Jan. 25, 1937—Dispatch No. 11 
[Ambassador Davies to Secretary of State Hull]). 
 86. See id. at 103–05 (Moscow, Mar. 12, 1937—Dispatch No. 116 [Ambassador Davies to 
Secretary of State Hull, titled ―Russian Industry—How It Works and Why‖]) (emphasis added). 
 87. See, e.g., Е.А. Коровин, К пересмотру ―Женевской Конвенции,‖ 15(3) СОВЕТСКОЕ 
ПРАВО 52 (1925) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Reexamination of the Geneva Convention, 15(3) SOVIET LAW 
52 (1925)].  
 88. Е.А. Коровин, Оговорка rebus sic stantibus в международной практике Р.С.Ф.С.Р., 6(3) 
СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 53 (1922) [E.A. Korovin, The Principle Rebus Sic Stantibus in International 
Practice of the RSFSR, 6(3) SOVIET LAW 53 (1922)] (upholding the classic conception of rebus sic 
stantibus principle and doctrine of necessity for violating positive treaty obligations). 
 89. Е.А. Коровин, Советские договоры и международное право 30(6) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 
91 (1927) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 30(6) SOVIET LAW 91 (1927)]. 
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protection of property in its domestic legislation. This issue is central to 
the present vertical harmonization analysis.  
2. The Dilemma of Reconciling Communism, NEP & IP  
Attracting and protecting foreign trade in the Soviet Union necessarily 
required the adoption of domestic laws to protect property, since without 
security, Western firms simply would not invest in Russia.
90
 Korovin and 
subsequent Soviet authors treated the protection of property under 
international law as questions of international administrative law, as 
apolitical issues on which cooperation with the West was not only 
permissible, but encouraged.
91
 Notwithstanding the centrality of property 
rights to domestic legal battles and theoretical debates, international 
protection of property rights, as in the case of intellectual property, was 
seen by Soviet theorists as a foreign policy issue, and hence subordinate to 
more pressing foreign trade-related policy discussions. For instance, 
despite not adhering to the Berne Convention of 1886
92
 or the revision to 
the treaty signed at Berlin in 1908,
93
 the early Soviet state took 
tremendous pains to signify its protection of foreigners‘ copyright, patents, 
and trademarks. This was done principally by harmonizing Soviet 
domestic legislation with international customary and conventional law—
tantamount to participating in the given treaty bodies, without actually 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., Н.В. МИРОНОВ, ПРАВОВОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНИХ СНОШЕНИЙ СССР (1917–
1970) 275 n.29 (ИМО, 1971) [NIKOLAI V. MIRONOV, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE USSR (1917–1970) 275 n.29 (IMO 1971)] (discussing a decree issued by the NKID on May 23, 
1919, ―[o]n the Prohibition of Protection of Property of Foreigners from States Which Have Severed 
Diplomatic Relations with RSFSR‖); И. БЕРНШТЕЙН, Б. ЛАНДАУ, В. МАШКЕВИЧ, ПРАВОВЫЕ 
УСЛОВИЯ КОНЦЕССИОННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ В СССР 26–47 (М: 1930) [I. BERNSTEIN, B. LANDAU & 
V. MASHKEVICH, LEGAL CONDITIONS OF CONCESSIONS IN THE USSR 26–47 (M: 1930)]. 
 91. See KOROVIN, CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 98–102. It is curious that 
Western legal historians have not focused more on this aspect of Soviet law and the contradictions 
between Marxist conceptions of private property, Lenin‘s formulation of state capitalism, and Stalin‘s 
foreign trade relations policy. It seems the contradiction concerning property and Soviet trade and 
concessions with Western firms was much more fertile soil for pointing out contradictions in Soviet 
theory and practice than revisiting the abstract debates concerning the nature of law.  
 92. The Berne Convention removed registration requirements to trigger copyright protection, and 
codified continental conceptions of moral rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Paris Act, arts. 2–3, 6 bis, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979); 
TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 154 n.93. The United States opposed the Berne Convention because of 
the removal of registration requirements. By contrast, as indicated above, the USSR removed domestic 
registration requirements, without formally acceding to the Berne Convention.  
 93. See TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 154 n.93.  
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doing so.
94
 We can trace this process by observing the evolution of Soviet 
domestic legislation on authors‘ rights. 
Authors’ Rights. Between 1924 and 1931, there were almost yearly 
radical changes to the IP regulatory framework and the administrative 
organs charged with implementing the laws.
95
 The earliest Soviet law 
concerning authors‘ rights and patent rights was a decree in 1917 
nationalizing all such rights ―in the interest of government,‖96 with limited 
protection for the authors. Pursuant to this decree, the duration of authors‘ 
rights was limited to six months, after which all rights reverted to the 
state.
97
  
Ivan Peretersky, writing in the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, analyzed these 
domestic legislative changes in the field of authors‘ rights following the 
Bolshevik revolution.
98
 What is immediately striking regarding these 
reforms was that they occurred so soon after the revolution. The first 
proposed decree on authors‘ rights was issued on December 6, 1917, just 
one month after the Bolsheviks gained control.
99
 Pursuant to this proposal, 
the length of the protected term was reduced to fifteen years, followed by a 
five-year period where the copyright
100
 was held by the state if the 
People‘s Commissariat of Enlightenment found it to have aesthetic or 
scientific value.
101
 The proposal was not adopted. Instead, an even more 
restrictive regime was adopted by decree on December 29, 1917, 
monopolizing authors‘ rights in favor of the state for a period of five 
years.
102
 Furthermore, on June 11, 1918, a decree was issued on the 
abolition of the inheritance of authors‘ rights, except in the case of heirs 
below the age of majority or incapable of working (нетрудоспособные 
 
 
 94. This strategy is remarkably similar to the IP reform efforts of the Russian Federation to 
comply with TRIPS throughout the 2000s without being a signatory or member of the WTO, an issue 
that will be discussed infra.  
 95. Галина Витальевна Довгань, Система государственных органов и общественных 
организаций в сфере изобретательства в УССР (1924–1931 гг.) [Galina V. Dovgan‘, System of 
State Organs and Social Organizations in the Sphere of Patent Protection in the Ukrainian SSR 
(1924–1931)], available at http://www.lomonosov-msu.ru/archive/Lomonosov_2008/28_4.pdf. 
 96. John N. Hazard, Notes on Economic Law (Prof. Amfitiatrov, 1936) at 90 (Manuscript 
Collection, Columbia University Libraries, Bakhmeteff Archive). 
 97. Id.  
 98. И. Перетерский, Задачи Советского законодательства в области авторстого права, 
4(1) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 92 (1923) [I. Peretersky, Goals of Soviet Legislation in the Field of Author’s 
Rights, 4(1) SOVIET LAW 92 (1923)].  
 99. Id. at 92. 
 100. I shall use the terms ―copyright‖ and ―author‘s rights‖ interchangeably. The term ―author‘s 
rights‖ is the preferred term in the Soviet literature (as well as in continental jurisprudence more 
generally), but the concepts and legal ramifications are identical.  
 101. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 92. 
 102. Id. 
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[disabled]).
103
 Shortly thereafter, on November 26, 1918, another decree 
was issued ―nationalizing scientific, literary and artistic works,‖104 
remaining in force until 1923.  
Pursuant to this decree, any work (published or unpublished) could be 
claimed by the state as its property.
105
 The relevant state agency then had 
the right to publication, reproduction, and public exhibition of the work.
106
 
The author was entitled to an honorarium, and in the case of minor 
children, remainder rights could be paid out to the heirs from the proceeds 
of the work.
107
 The author‘s right expired six months after death.108 
Interestingly, in regulations promulgated by the People‘s Commissariat on 
Enlightenment on February 9, 1919, the old fifty-year terms were used for 
works created prior to the nationalization, or specifically, June 1, 1919.
109
  
These conflicting decrees were systematically reworked following the 
introduction of NEP, not only to protect domestic authors, but also to 
incorporate international protections for the defense of foreign authors. 
Peretersky indicates that more than one year went into the drafting of the 
new law on authors‘ rights.110 This new law was intended to be a departure 
from the Russian Imperial Code of 1911, both in substance and spirit, but 
Peretersky‘s account points to tension within the Institute of Soviet Law in 
the drafting of the new code.
111
 First, much like American opposition to 
the Berne Convention on the basis of moral rights, drafters had difficulty 
conceptualizing precisely what was being protected—whether it was the 
abstract ―spiritualized‖ right of the author to his or her creation or the 
work product of this spiritual, ―psychological‖ process.112 Moreover, there 
were proposals to discard this distinction, as well as the distinction 
between authors‘ rights and patents over physical inventions, in favor of a 
broad principle protecting quite simply, products of labor, consistent with 
Marxist ideology.
113
 After discussing at length the legal distinction 
between patents and authors‘ rights, Peretersky conceded the need for 
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 92.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 93. In addition, by decree dated August 16, 1921, all textbooks were to be published by 
the state publishing house ГосИздат (Gosizdat). Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 93–94. 
 112. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 93–94. 
 113. Id. at 94. 
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different terms and legal protection regimes, though the goal, in principle, 
was a single unitary system.
114
  
Peretersky‘s Marxist critique of copyright law illuminates how Soviet 
theorists balanced individual versus (what they considered) new social 
rights.
115
 According to Peretersky, the state had rights to the given work 
because the actual creator of the work was not merely the individual 
author, but also the social medium in which he or she worked.
116
 Next, 
since copyright, like all law, was not a logical but a historical construct, 
copyright law had to take into account relevant economic relations of 
production and the social utility of given works.
117
 However, it is 
remarkable to observe the workings of the NEP and the hold of the 
capitalist mindset, as Peretersky concludes that defense of authors‘ rights 
was necessary to protect the incentives for the creation of works—a 
proposition completely incompatible with Marxist thought.
118
 Thus, 
Peretersky proposed reintroduction of all Imperial-era rights, such as the 
author‘s right to prevent alteration of his or her ―mental child,‖ the right of 
reproduction, and the right of compensation for takings.
119
 To the extent 
that the government retained rights, these had to be limited so that the state 
could not seize works for commercial benefit.
120
 With respect to the 
objects of copyright, Peretersky suggested sweeping categories, including 
traditional works, but also new works stemming from the introduction of 
film (Peretersky suggested copyright over plotlines to films, whether they 
were written or not).
121
 Lastly, Peretersky suggested the introduction of a 
uniform template publication agreement (between publishers and authors) 
modeled on the Swiss contract code of 1911, subjecting publication 
contracts to the statute of frauds.
122
  
Peretersky‘s discussion elided conflicts of laws issues and international 
treaties, but these became major points of contention in subsequent 
writings. With economic growth came the decree of 1925, which 
established longer duration terms,
123
 but maintained the widest possible 
 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 95. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 94–95. 
 118. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 95. 
 119. Id. at 96. 
 120. Id. at 97. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 99. 
 123. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 5, at xiv–
xv. 
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state use and public use exceptions, such as translation of foreign works 
without compensation.
124
  
Furthermore, the Soviet Union took a favorable position on the Berne 
Convention (continuing the Imperial legacy).
125
 The Berne treaty regime 
was affirmed in bilateral treaties with a number of European states. For 
example, the Soviet-German treaty ―on the defense of industrial property‖ 
dated October 12, 1925 required the USSR to apply German law and IP 
protections in dealings with German citizens and firms.
126
 Despite 
recognizing the Berne protections, the Soviet Union entered into a number 
of separate agreements where the USSR claimed broad state-use 
exemptions in the ―use of the technical and cultural heritage of the West,‖ 
which Korovin justified by reference to the ―[Soviet] material and cultural 
paucity.‖127  
The 1925 set of fundamental principles on authors‘ rights was 
expanded in 1928, and ultimately codified in the Law on Author‘s Rights 
of October 8, 1928. Pursuant to this law, the author‘s right expanded from 
25 years from the date of publication or presentation, to the life of the 
author, plus fifteen years after the author‘s death. In the opinion of Soviet 
jurists, these copyright terms were entirely consistent with international 
norms.
128
 Soviet jurists were of the same opinion on the related 
harmonization process with respect to trademarks and patents.
129
  
In fact, by 1935, Pashukanis dropped any opposition to international 
conventions for the defense of industrial or property rights.
130
 In formalist 
fashion, he wrote about the International Council for the Defense of 
 
 
 124. Hazard, supra note 96, at 90. 
 125. KOROVIN, CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 91, at 100. 
 126. Id. at 99. 
 127. Id. at 100. 
 128. Id.  
 129. NEP and post-NEP Soviet legislation fully protected domestic and foreign trademarks in 
accordance with bilateral and general principles outlined in international agreements. Writing on 
trademarks in 1924, S.I. Raevich began his article with a note on how ―fortunate‖ it was that 
trademarks received sufficient legislative attention both during the period of war communism and the 
NEP and remarked how consistent Soviet patent legislation was with European standards. С.И. 
Раевич, О товарных знаках по советскому праву, 12(6) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 64 (1924) [S.I. 
Raevich, On Trademarks in Soviet Law, 12(6) SOVIET LAW 64 (1924)]. With the adoption of the law 
―On Patents on Inventions‖ in 1924, the committee on inventions under the Supreme Soviet of the 
National Economy (ВСНХ СССР) continued functioning, but its prerogative was greatly restricted to 
issuing applications, licenses for the use of models, shop drawings and trademarks. Dovgan‘, supra 
note 95, at 1. The patent system introduced in 1924 created a patent bureau and required users to 
obtain permission of the patent owner prior to using the invention. Id. (citing ВСНХ СССР №11 от 
25.11.1925). 
 130. Е. ПАШУКАНИС, ОЧЕРКИ ПО МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМУ ПРАВУ 165–66 (Гос. Изд. Сов. 
Законодательство, 1935) [E. PASHUKANIS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 165–66 (State Publ. 
Soviet Jurisprudence 1935)]. 
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Industrial Property rights founded in Berne in 1883 (pursuant to the 1883 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property).
131
 To 
Pashukanis, these ―special questions of international law‖ and 
international administrative unions were to be analyzed based on a 
concrete estimate of their expected utility.
132
 He saw no danger or conflict 
between these special treaty bodies and overarching Soviet principles, so 
long as they did not signify the wholesale adoption of bourgeois systems 
or conflation into the League of Nations apparatus.
133
  
Whereas to the early Pashukanis, the debate over property concerned 
the basic form/substance distinction and the legal notion of property 
(including socialist property concepts in Soviet law) was but a sham for 
what was in essence bourgeois law,
134
 by the late 1920s scholars like 
Korovin succeeded in showing that it was permissible to use seemingly 
bourgeois constructs during the transition stage to communism. Both 
Korovin and Pashukanis reconciled the seeming contradiction between 
intellectual property protection and Marxist theory by situating both in a 
broader international law and foreign policy context. Whereas lesser 
figures like Dotsenko continued to struggle to create a theoretical 
distinction between private property and personal property—where private 
property was deemed to be that which was acquired as a result of 
commercial enterprise (as for instance, under NEP), and personal property 
was that acquired as a result of work in a communal enterprise (such as the 
Kolkhoz)
135—Korovin‘s notion of the transition theory and 
instrumentalism obviated the need to ground intellectual property 
discussions in more fundamentally theoretical terms. To put it another 
way, protecting intellectual property rights was indispensable to attract 
trade, and trade was indispensable to strengthening the Soviet state; 
likewise, whatever was necessary to strengthen the Soviet state was 
consistent with Marxist-Leninist tenets. This position was solidly endorsed 
by Pashukanis‘ successor, Andrey Vyshinsky,136 and continued to serve as 
 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 165. 
 133. Pashukanis observed that Article 24 of the Statute of the League subordinated existing treaty 
bodies to the League. Id. at 164–65. However, aside from the expressed desire to see these bodies 
separate, Pashukanis offers no discussion of the interaction of the various administrative organs and 
the League.  
 134. See generally PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 6. 
 135. Id. at 9. 
 136. Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian Revolution, 
14 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 27 (2001) (discussing Vyshinsky‘s arguments in defense of law and 
―stability of laws‖ by reference to property rights: ―[Vyshinsky‘s examples of the need for law] all 
concerned the protection of private property interests. ‗To reduce law to policy would be to ignore 
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the basis for the Soviet ―stability of laws‖ doctrine for the remainder of the 
Soviet Union.  
C. Late Soviet IP Protection: An Overview 
Having discussed the centrality of the property rights and vertical 
harmonization debates in the creation of the early Soviet state, it is 
worthwhile to explore the late or ―classic‖ Soviet treatment of IP law. This 
section provides an overview of this phase of the Soviet IP regime, 
including the USSR‘s participation in international conventions 
concerning intellectual property.  
In the domestic realm, Soviet copyright law resembled European civil 
law authors‘ rights protections, with a major distinction being the goal of 
the law. From the Soviet perspective, Soviet copyright law sought to 
balance the rights between authors and ―society,‖ whereas Western law 
was seen as being unfavorably biased towards publishers against 
authors.
137
 However, despite this rhetorical position, Western 
commentators writing on Soviet copyright law stressed the similarities to 
European regimes. Western comparativists routinely remarked on the 
Soviet‘s relatively unremarkable, and even ―unexciting,‖138 distinctions 
with respect to Western copyright law, contrary to what one would expect 
from a socialist state. Unlike Cuba‘s complete disavowal of copyright law 
in the 1960s,
139
 for instance, the Soviet Union fully ascribed to reigning 
international obligations throughout its existence (whether by conforming 
domestic law to international standards, or by joining the relevant treaties).  
On the international plane, the Soviet Union was a state party to the 
three principal conventions relating to authors‘ rights from the mid-1970s: 
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as 
amended in 1971; the Universal Copyright Convention (―UCC‖) as 
amended in 1971
140
 (the USSR ratified the UCC in 1973); and the 1971 
 
 
such tasks confronting law as that of the legal defense of personal, property, family and inheritance 
rights and interests, and the like.‘‖).  
 137. Dietrich A. Loeber, ―Socialist‖ Features of Soviet Copyright Law, 23 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 297–98 (1985) [hereinafter Loeber] (offering an excellent introduction to Soviet 
copyright law). 
 138. Id. at 298–302. 
 139. Id. at 302–03 (quoting Fidel Castro Speaks, 214, 218 (1969)). Cf. Ley No. 14 de 28 de 
diciembre de 1977, Ley del Derecho de Autor, available at http://www.cenda.cu/php/loader.php?cont 
=legis.php&tipo=2 (harmonizing Cuban copyright law with international standards).  
 140. Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, with Appendix 
Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1971, July 24, 1971, 
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/.  
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Convention on Protection of the Interests of Producers of Phonograms 
Against the Illegal Reproduction of their Phonograms. The major legal 
maneuver exercised by the USSR concerned its accession to the UCC in 
1973. The Soviet Union adopted the UCC before the 1971 Paris 
amendments to the UCC went into force,
141
 so as to avoid the 1971 
amendments which gave authors greater exclusive rights to their work and 
significantly restricted legal licenses.
142
  
On February 21, 1973, six days before the USSR deposited its 
declaration of accession to the UCC, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR enacted a series of amendments to chapter IV of the 1961 
Fundamentals to bring the Soviet copyright law in line with the minimum 
requirements the UCC imposed.
143
 Ultimately, in 1978 the USSR acceded 
to the Paris amendments, subject to a reservation granting liberal use of 
Soviet works by developing countries. The political justification for the 
USSR acceding to the treaties was explained in a separate letter (1978) 
from the USSR to the treaty body:  
Desirous of helping to create favorable conditions for the use of the 
works of Soviet authors by the developing countries for educational 
purposes, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the 
application of the aforementioned Convention to the works of 
Soviets [sic] authors.
144
  
With its accession to the UCC, scholars observed that a seemingly dual 
system of copyright law emerged. For works published by domestic 
authors (or works by foreigners which were first published on USSR 
territory), the Soviet copyright legislation applied. On the other hand, 
international law governed copyright rights for foreign works. As analyzed 
by Michiel Elst, the consequences of this dual system of copyright were 
felt particularly in the limitations of copyright.
145
 Thus, domestic authors‘ 
rights were subject to the most far-reaching free uses and legal licenses, 
 
 
 141. See ELST, supra note 5, at 82 n.147. 
 142. Id. An amendment made at the Paris diplomatic conference in 1971 pertained to Article VI 
bis (1) & (2) relating to reproduction, public use, and transmission of works by radio. See M.M. 
BOGUSLAVSKII, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SOVIET APPROACH 173 (William Simons trans., 
1988); see also Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention: 
Unesco House, Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971 (Unesco 1973). 
 143. See ELST, supra note 5, at 82–83. 
 144. Supra note 140 (Universal Copyright Convention, with Appendix Declaration relating to 
Articles XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1952, UNESCO Convention Documents, Protocol 
2 (letter from the USSR dated August 24, 1978)). 
 145. ELST, supra note 5, at 95. 
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whereas those who fell within the purview of the UCC enjoyed broader 
protection.  
This dual system had noticeable practical effects. For instance, if a 
musical work of a Soviet writer was publicly performed, it could be freely 
reproduced in a film or freely broadcast on radio and television. On the 
contrary, public performance of a work by a foreign author did not subject 
the author to the free use exemptions or legal licenses of Soviet law: the 
author‘s permission was required146 because the extent of fair use/legal 
license use in the domestic context was quite broad,
147
 especially for 
educational or scientific purposes.
148
 However, with the Soviet state often 
the copyright holder, and in many instances the ostensible copyright 
encroacher, copyright issues in the domestic arena were mostly moot.
149
 
With respect to traditional copyright protection issues (length of term, 
etc.), Soviet domestic implementation of the UCC was consistent with 
international standards.
150
 The term of protection was twenty-five years 
after the death of the author with remainder rights paid out to heirs, much 
like in capitalist states.
151
  
Elst correctly notes that the foreign-domestic duality in Soviet 
copyright law was untenable. However, when Soviet jurists recognized 
this discrepancy, their solution was to simply adapt the much broader free 
use standards found in Soviet copyright law to international law, and not 
vice versa.
152
 In other words, consistent with the USSR‘s political and 
cultural policy, reconciling ―fair use‖ between Soviet law and international 
norms often meant adopting the wider fair use exemptions. For purposes 
of the present analysis, this can be rephrased as rejection of vertical 
harmonization. By insisting on its own legal standards, the Soviet Union 
 
 
 146. See id. at 95–99. 
 147. Id. It was also expanded domestically in 1973 to permit newspapers to reproduce any 
published report or scientific, artistic, literary, or oral work; either in the original or as a translation. 
MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 110 (Praeger 1978). This was used 
famously by Soviet literary journals to publish translations of Vonnegut‘s Breakfast of Champions and 
Norman Mailer‘s Marylin. Due to highly-publicized protests from the West, the Soviet Union bought 
publishing rights to the works shortly thereafter. Id. at 111–12.  
 148. NEWCITY, supra note 147, at 112. 
 149. SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE 
LEGE LATA AC FERENDA, NO. 22(I): LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE 420–21 (Martinus Nijhoff 1979) 
(listing instances where copyright claims could not be invoked against the state pursuant to Soviet civil 
law limitations despite being enumerated as fundamental constitutional or traditional author‘s rights). 
 150. Loeber, supra note 137, at 299–300. 
 151. Id. at 300 (―As to the property rights of the deceased—the royalties—comparative lawyers 
would expect some ‗socialist‘ impact on the law, such as the denial of monetary benefits to an heir on 
the grounds that these would accrue to him as ‗unearned income.‘ Soviet law, however, stops short of 
imposing such a limitation and conforms in this respect to capitalist practices.‖). 
 152. ELST, supra note 5, at 101. 
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was maintaining an exceptionalist posture on the issue of broad fair use 
protections.  
With respect to actual enforcement of copyright claims against the 
Soviet Union, it should be noted that very few claims (foreign or 
domestic) actually proceeded through the Soviet judiciary. Peter Maggs, in 
his introduction to the copyright volume of Soviet Statutes and Decisions, 
explained that this was due to the realities and context of state 
publishing.
153
 The limitation on who could actually publish authors‘ works 
and control the revenues and royalties indeed presented a serious 
limitation on the free exercise of rights, although some transfers did 
occur.
154
 Moreover, in the domestic context, copyright infringement claims 
were limited by the remedies available to aggrieved parties through Soviet 
civil, labor, and administrative law, representing the interplay between the 
three major characteristics of the Soviet system: socialist property, 
economic planning, and the leading role of the Communist Party.
155
 With 
respect to foreign claims, interpretation of obligations arising under 
international treaties was rare due to the small number of potential 
disputes involving foreign claimants.  
By the mid-1980s, advances in technology required the modernization 
of Soviet IP law (as in other countries) to reflect the challenge posed by 
new digital reproduction technologies. During this time, like most legal 
systems, the Soviet system only sporadically investigated the challenges 
posed to copyright by technical advances.
156
  
II. RUSSIAN IP LAW (1992–2006): TRANSITION 
A. Change, Transplants, and Harmonization 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia‘s IP regime underwent a 
radical series of transformations. Generally speaking, they can be divided 
into three periods. The first, lasting from 1992 to 1994, was a period of 
indigenous change with law reform proposals originating from working 
groups established in the dying days of the USSR. The second period, 
 
 
 153. Loeber, supra note 137, at 312 (citing 14 SOVIET STATUTES AND DECISIONS 5 (P.B. Maggs 
ed., 1977–78)). 
 154. Id. at 303–12. 
 155. Id. 
 156. ELST, supra note 5, at 109. 
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roughly from 1995 to 2006, was a period of legal transplantation
157
 and 
vertical harmonization.
158
 Here, vertical harmonization characterizes the 
relationship between Russia and international trade bodies like the WTO, 
as well as the perception of more diffuse norms or general principles of 
international law.
159
 This period is notable because it coincided with what 
Gianmaria Ajani identified as the second stage of transition and law 
reform in Russia, ―marked by a more critical approach towards ‗paper 
laws‘ and by a more conscious attitude towards the ‗Anglo-American 
thinking‘ of legal advisers and of international financial institutions.‖160 
Because IP reform in Russia followed other reforms, this period may also 
reveal how Russian policymakers internalized the lessons of preceding 
reforms in other substantive fields, if at all. Lastly, the third period of IP 
reform corresponds to the adoption of Part IV of the Russian Civil Code 
on November 24, 2006 (effective January 1, 2008), intended to supersede 
all previous legislation relating to intellectual property and to bring 
Russian law into compliance with international obligations.  
Scholars have chronicled the evolution of Russia‘s IP regime in 
exceedingly detailed accounts,
161
 so there is no need to retell the reform 
process, save but in general strokes. As a state successor to the USSR, the 
Russian Federation remained a state party to each of the treaties discussed 
above.
162
 Aside from inheriting Soviet treaty obligations, the Russian 
Federation was also heir to a new Soviet intellectual property law which 
was to go into effect in the USSR on January 1, 1992, but actually went 
into force in the new Russian Federation on August 3, 1992. This 
 
 
 157. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); 
Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 93, 93 n.1 (1995).  
 158. Peter Maggs, The Process of Codification in Russia: Lessons Learned from the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 44 MCGILL L.J. 281 (1999). 
 159. See Larry Catá Backer, Introduction and Analysis, in HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND RESISTANCE 13–14 (Larry Catá Backer ed., 
2007) (discussing vertical integration, and citing the definition of harmonization as the ―effect [of] an 
approximation or co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major 
differences and crating minimum requirements or standards‖). 
 160. Ajani, supra note 157, at 96. 
 161. See generally ELST, supra note 5. 
 162. In 1994, Victor Chernomyrdin issued a governmental decree to clarify that Russian 
Federation inherited its international treaty obligations with respect to IP. See Russian Federation, 
decree no. 1224/1994: О присоединении Российской Федерации к Бернской конвенции об охране 
литературных и художественных произведений в редакции 1971 года, Всемирной конвенции об 
авторском праве в редакции 1971 года и дополнительным Протоколам 1 и 2, Конвенции 1971 
года об охране интересов производителей фонограмм от незаконного воспроизводства их 
фонограмм, November 3, 1994 (Russian) [Governmental decree no. 1224 from 1994, signed by 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, Regarding Russia‘s Accession to the Berne Convention, UCC, and the 1971 
Additional Protocols to the UCC], available at http://www.copyrighter.ru/full/index.html?berne4.htm. 
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legislation lasted only one year before being replaced by the Law on 
Author‘s Rights and Neighboring Rights, which went into force on August 
3, 1993.
163
  
In a clean break with the Soviet past, the 1993 Russian Constitution 
also recognized and protected by law ―intellectual property‖ as an 
aggregate of exclusive rights to the results of intellectual activity.
164
 The 
use of the term ―intellectual property‖ versus authors‘ rights is significant 
as it was the first time the term was used in Russian legislation since the 
early 1920s. As relevant to the discussion below, the Russian Constitution 
also enshrined additional limited guarantees with respect to mass 
information. For instance, Article 29(4) provides: ―Each shall have the 
right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate 
information by any legal means.‖165 Similarly, Article 29(5) provides that 
―[t]he freedom of mass information shall be guaranteed.‖ These rights 
must be interpreted in light of the copyright law, and vice versa, but 
Russian courts have yet to rule on any likely conflicts.
166
  
Equally important, the 1993 Russian Constitution codified a monist 
conception of international law.
167
 Article 15, Section 4 proclaimed that 
general principles of international law, customary international norms and 
international agreements to which Russia is a party shall henceforth be 
constitutive norms of the Russian legal system.
168
 Pursuant to the plain 
 
 
 163. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra 
note 5, at xvi; see also id. at 15 (providing an English translation of the 1993 law).  
 164. See Konstitutsiia Russiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 44, available at 
http://www.gov.ru/main/konst/konst11.html. 
 165. Id. art 29(4); WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 710 (2d ed. 2003) (providing an English 
translation of 1993 Russian Constitution).  
 166. The above provisions respecting freedom of information have been interpreted to refer to the 
government‘s duty to release information. However, as explained fully below, this provision may also 
be read more broadly to suggest a protection of the means of access to mass information, such as the 
Internet. For instance, such a broad protection may be employed to immunize Russian Internet service 
providers from their customers‘ copyright violations.  
 167. In the USSR, the relationship of treaties to municipal law was one of the most hotly-
contested issues in international law. One view was that the act of ratification of a treaty by the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was ―a special normative act imparting legal force to 
international treaty norms.‖ William E. Butler, Comparative Approaches to International Law, 190 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 52–53 (1985). Another view held that transformation of national legislation 
was necessary before an international treaty became part of municipal law. Id. at 53. Third, according 
to Article 21 of the 1978 USSR Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and 
Denunciation of International Treaties, certain treaties became automatically binding upon 
incorporation pursuant to Article 21. Id.  
 168. Konstitutsiia Russiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [CONSTITUTION], Art. 15, available at http:// 
www.gov.ru/main/konst/konst11.html (―Общепризнанные принципы и нормы международного 
права и международные договоры Российской Федерации являются составной частью ее 
правовой системы. Если международным договором Российской Федерации установлены иные 
правила, чем предусмотренные законом, то применяются правила международного договора.‖ 
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language of Article 15, international treaties were elevated higher even 
than domestic legislation: under Section 4, if an international convention 
contravenes other laws, then the international convention trumps domestic 
law.
169
 Article 15, Section 4 itself did not stipulate whether international 
law required national implementation, translation, or transformation, or 
whether international treaties are self-implementing.
170
 Accordingly, the 
constitutional provision immediately became the locus of a major debate 
in post-Soviet international legal theory.
171
 This debate, by and large, has 
continued to the present day.
172
 
Returning to the copyright law, the 1993 Law on Author‘s Rights and 
Neighboring Rights was not well received by either Russian scholars or 
Western observers. While the law recognized individuals‘ property rights 
in cultural and artistic works of their own creation, it considerably reduced 
the list of free uses, a longstanding custom in Soviet IP law. Remaining 
free uses were defined much more narrowly than before, and compulsory 
licenses were abolished altogether.
173
 From the West‘s viewpoint, the 1993 
law reform package lacked many of the basic elements found in Western 
practice, such as the right to alienate and encumber intellectual property 
rights.
174
 Accordingly, the legislative package was quickly tabled for 
amendment. Incidentally, this was to have positive consequences, as it 
allowed legislators to assess the impact of emerging information 
 
 
[―General principles and norms of international law, and international treaties to which Russian 
Federation is a party, are constitutive parts of Russia‘s legal system. If national law contradicts 
international treaties, then international law supersedes national legislation.‖]). 
 169. Id. 
 170. В.В. Гаврилов, Теории трансформации и имплементации норм международного права 
в отечественной правовой доктрине. 2 МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 39–61 
(2001) [V.V. Gavrilov, Theories of Transformation and Implementation of International Legal Norms 
in Russian Legal Doctrine, 2 MOSCOW J. INT‘L L. 39, 40 (2001)], available at http://www.law.edu.ru/ 
article/article.asp?articleID=162606. 
 171. Е.Т. Усенко, Соотношение и взаимодействие международного и национального права 
и Российская Конституция, 2 МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 16 (1995) [E.T. 
Usenko, Correlation and Interrelationship of International and Domestic Law and the Russian 
Constitution, 2 MOSCOW J. INT‘L L. 16 (1995)]; B.B. Гаврилов, Теории трансформации и 
имплементации норм международного права в отечественной правовой доктрине. 2 
МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 39, 39–61 (2001) [Gavrilov, supra note 170, at 
39–61. 
 172. See K.N. Ratsiborinskaia, Application of International Law by Russian Courts, in RUSSIAN 
LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 59 (2004); O.A. Ishchenko & E.G. Ishchenko, Implementation of 
International Law in Russian Legislation, 2 RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 196 (2008); L.L. 
Ponomareva, International Law in Decisions of Russian Criminal Courts, 1 RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY & 
PRACTICE 52, 55–59 (2008) (discussing the Surgut District Court‘s failure to consider international 
standards and extradition rules, and proposing legislative changes to require courts to explain 
analytical process in court decisions). 
 173. ELST, supra note 5, at 370–75. 
 174. Id. 
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technologies and to compare similar reform projects then being proposed 
in various jurisdictions, as well as internationally.  
The Russian civil code was incrementally amended in 1995 and 2004 
to further conform Russian domestic law with evolving TRIPS
175
 and 
bilateral obligations.
176
 Generally speaking, the 1995 and 2004 reforms 
kept with longstanding Soviet practice and the civil law tradition. Rights 
were based on the moral theory of authors‘ rights; that is, an author has 
exclusive rights to use his works, including the rights of reproduction, 
distribution, ―communication to the general public by cable,‖ and others 
(all referred to as the ―property rights‖). The copyright law applied broadly 
to any work, whether technical, artistic, or of another nature, and also to 
all reproducible media.
177
 The 2006 reform also added to the list of 
exclusive rights an ―Internet right‖178—that is, the right of 
―communication of a work in such a way that it is accessible for any 
person in the interactive mode from any place and at any time at his choice 
(right of making available to the general public).‖179 A limited fair use 
exemption was provided in Articles 20–24 covering traditional cultural, 
educational, and scientific uses.
180
 Part IV of the Russian Civil Code was 
adopted in 2006 and became effective on January 1, 2008.  
These reforms were meant to be evolutionary and to gradually 
modernize and bring Russian law in line with international norms. 
 
 
 175. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  
 176. Sergey Budylin & Yulia Osipova, Is AllofMP3 Legal? Non-Contractual Licensing under 
Russian Copyright Law, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3 n.16 (2007). 
 177. In addition to the General Law on Author‘s Rights, there also exists a 1992 Law on the Legal 
Protection of Programs of Electronic Computers and Data Bases (as amended 24 December, 2004). 
See WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 5, at 
xxii. Pursuant to this law, ―[c]omputer programs are treated as works of literature, and data bases, as 
collections.‖ Id. The substantive provisions of the law are similar to the Law on Author‘s Rights. Id. A 
Russian Agency for the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Data Bases, and Topologies of 
Integral Microcircuits was formed to register computer programs, data bases, and topologies and 
contracts assigning such (pursuant to the 1992 law on Computers and Data Bases, amended in 2004). 
Id. at xxii–xxiii. However, it is unclear how many computer programs were or are voluntarily 
registered with this agency.  
 178. In 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued an advisory opinion seeking to 
clarify the then-existing copyright law, delineate civil and criminal jurisdiction, procedure and 
evidentiary rules, and highlight the need for further reform as a result of challenges posed by the 
Internet. See Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: О вопросах, возникших у судов при 
рассмотрении гражданских дел, связанных с применением законодательства об авторском 
праве и смежных правах, Plenum decision no. 15 of June 19, 2006 [On Questions Regarding the 
Application of the Copyright Law], available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=4349. 
 179. See Budylin & Osipova, supra note 176, at 4 (this provision went into effect on September 1, 
2006, but has since been superseded by Part IV of the Russian Civil Code). 
 180. 1993 Law on Author‘s Rights and Neighboring Rights, Arts. 20–24 (author‘s translation). 
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However, aside from mandatory harmonization required by Article 15(4) 
of the Russian Constitution, Russia also sought to voluntarily harmonize 
its domestic IP regime with WTO-related IP norms. Yet how did Russia 
interpret these obligations? To what extent did Russia succeed in 
coordinating its domestic legal regime with TRIPs? These questions can 
be analyzed through Russia‘s evolving conceptions of fair use/free license 
in copyright policy. Fair use is a useful analytical frame because it 
illustrates where a legal regime strikes the balance between individual 
rights to a given work and social or public rights. For instance, if during 
Soviet times legal doctrine avoided the term ―intellectual property‖ 
altogether—criticizing it ―for not only its inaccuracy but for being 
bourgeois and exploitative‖181—and provided fairly broad fair use 
exceptions to copyright, analyzing fair use in the post-Soviet context 
elucidates the continuities/changes between Soviet and post-Soviet 
sensibilities
182
 towards intellectual property more broadly.  
Prior to embarking on the fair use analysis, however, a review is 
necessary of the driving forces, both domestic and international, behind 
the harmonization reforms.  
B. Policy-Driven Harmonization (2000–Present)  
Effective January 1, 2008, Russia‘s entire intellectual property regime 
was codified in a new Part IV of the Russian Civil Code.
183
 The stated 
purpose of Russia‘s new Part IV of the Civil Code (―New Copyright 
Law‖) was to bring Russian copyright law into line with international 
copyright norms.
184
 The express goal was harmonization of Russia‘s entire 
IP regime—not merely individual normative acts, but the entire regulatory 
and enforcement system—with the standards set forth in multilateral 
conventions, namely TRIPS, but also other conventions.
185
 The law reform 
 
 
 181. William E. Butler, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 
5, at x.  
 182. ―Sensibility‖ here refers to the opinions of legal scholars and policymakers regarding a given 
proposition. Research has revealed no opinion polls or ethnographic data on the topic of intellectual 
property rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the perspective of Soviet citizens. The 
assertions, therefore, are based on logical inferences, doctrinal writings and a small unscientific 
opinion sample from Russian colleagues.  
 183. Alexander L. Makovsky, On the Fourth Part of Russia’s Civil Code, in CIVIL CODE OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, FOURTH PART 24 (Peter Maggs & Alexander Makovsky eds., 2008) (offering a 
parallel English-Russian translation). 
 184. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSLISKOI FEDERATSII [GKRF] [Civil Code] pt. 4, available at 
http://www.internet-Law.ru/law/kodeks/gk4.htm (Russ.). 
 185. V.N. Monakhov, Conference Presentation at Moscow State University Faculty of Journalism: 
Mass Information in Internet: Freedom and Responsibility (Oct. 12–13, 2007). A draft version of the 
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project followed more than ten years of advisory work from the United 
States, the WTO and international IP organizations.
186
 The reform project 
was championed by a number of domestic actors, such as the Moscow 
Media Law and Policy Institute and media industry groups, who sought to 
clarify the confusing maze of rights and obligations under previous 
legislative enactments. But a foreign lobby also took active part in shaping 
the new law. A common overarching political reality for both camps was 
that perceived success/failure of the reforms would influence Russia‘s 
accession to the WTO.
187
  
1. WTO, TRIPS & the American Lobby  
Russia‘s long road to WTO membership began almost twenty-five 
years ago. Even under the Soviet Union, one of the first steps of the 
Gorbachev administration was to apply for membership to the GATT in 
August 18, 1986, and to participate in the Uruguay Rounds, both of which 
were rejected by the West.
188
 The Russian Federation reapplied for GATT 
membership in 1993, one year after the dissolution of the USSR.
189
 
 
 
present section was presented at the conference. Sample treaties include the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9, 1886, last amended 1979), in force in the Russia 
Federation since March 13, 1995; Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (May 21, 1974), in force in Russian Federation since 
January 20, 1989; Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source 
on Goods (Apr. 14, 1981) (revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 
1925, at London on June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958 and was added to in Stockholm 
on July 14, 1967); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Mar. 20, 1883, last 
amended 1979), in force in Russian Federation since August 12, 2009; Patent Law Treaty (Sept. 1, 
2000), with currently signed parties, in force in Russian Federation since August 12, 2009; Convention 
for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their 
Phonograms (Oct. 29, 1971), with 80 currently signed parties, in force in the Russian Federation since 
March 13, 1995; Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (Oct. 26, 1961), in force in Russian Federation since May 26, 2003; 
Trademark Law Treaty (Oct. 27, 1994), with 77 signers, and which the Russian Federation signed May 
11, 1998; Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (May 26, 
1986), the ten signers of which include Zambia, Serbia, Saint Lucia, Liberia, India, Guatemala, Ghana, 
Egypt, China, Bosnia and Herzegovina; WIPO Copyright Treaty (Dec. 20, 1996); WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (Dec. 20, 1996).  
 186. Ольга Плешанова, Гражданский кодекс разошелся с требованиями ВТО, Коммерсантъ 
(24.07.2006) [Olga Pleshanova, Civil Code Departs from Demands of WTO, Kommersant (July 24, 
2006), available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=692256. 
 187. RUSSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CULTURAL 
HERITAGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS, FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARK M. 
BOGUSLAVSKIJ (A. Trunk, R. Knieper A.G. & Svetlanov eds., Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2004). 
 188. KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC 
ORDER 187 (1987). 
 189. Elmira Danelyan, Russia’s Long Journey to the WTO: Whose Interests Will Be Served if 
Russia Joins the World Club?, 1:4 LANDSLIDE 52, 52 (2009). 
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Russia‘s WTO accession process has been tumultuous, and reflects many 
of the broader anxieties about liberalization reforms in Russia over the 
past twenty years. This is not the place to delve into the large amount of 
literature on Russia and the WTO,
190
 but a review of the debate over 
TRIPS
191
 and IP reform is necessary.  
Russia‘s IP regime first gained widespread global attention around the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, when a vocal opposition to Russian piracy, 
coupled with lax IP regulation, began to take shape in the West.
192
 The 
West‘s criticism had several roots. First, Russia‘s large, highly educated 
and technologically savvy work force (diminished and, perhaps, 
emboldened by the ―brain drain‖ of the 1990s) began to use the Internet to 
download vast amounts of copyrighted Western-sourced media, including 
video games, computer programs, films, music, and electronic books. 
Second, around the late 1990s, the rate of high-profile hacking, spamming 
and phishing attacks originating from Russia began to multiply 
exponentially. These attacks raised public awareness of the danger posed 
by emerging technologies, especially in light of the then-impending Y2K 
crisis. A third publicized source of tension between America and Russia 
was America‘s allegation that the Russian government was complicit in its 
public‘s obsession with Internet piracy by completely disregarding its 
obligations to protect copyright with respect to new and emerging 
technologies.
193
 This was seen as stemming from weak enforcement 
mechanisms, corruption, low penalties, and ―lack of education and training 
for law enforcement and judicial officials.‖194 
 
 
 190. Chiedu Osakwe et al., Russia’s Accession to the WTO, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa= 
eventDetail&id=1496; see also Jasmine Cameron, WTO Accession and Legal Tradition in the Area of 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparative Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 11 J. EAST 
EUROPEAN LAW 1 (2004); Mike Moore, Director-General, World Trade Organization, speech at the 
Fifth Annual Russian Economic Forum: Russia and the WTO: Reintegration in the World Economy 
(Apr. 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/spmm_f/spmm84_f.htm; Harry G. 
Broadman, Russian Trade Policy Reform for WTO Accession, 401 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 
41, 51–53 (1999); Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMillian, Russian and the World Trade 
Organization: Will TRIPS Be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 519 
(1998). 
 191. The TRIPS Agreement, in concordance with the general WTO regime, prohibits intellectual 
property laws from offering any benefits to local citizens which are not available to citizens of other 
TRIPS signatories.  
 192. See David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive 
Approach for Western Plaintiffs, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1203, 1220–22 (2000). 
 193. Id. at 1207–12. 
 194. Hearing to Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia: Before the Subcommittee 
on Trade of the House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 48 (2002) 
(statement of Thomas R. Pickering, Senior Vice President, International Relations, Boeing). 
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A common sentiment among Western observers in the early to mid-
2000s was that among the world leaders in global music piracy, Russia 
had one of the largest piracy problems in the world because of inadequate 
laws and enforcement mechanisms.
195
 Despite a computer-literacy and 
population growth rate that was a fraction of China‘s, the Russian threat 
was perceived as equaling, if not exceeding, China‘s. This was partly due 
to China‘s earlier adoption of IP regulations (China joined the WTO in 
2001), but may also have reflected Cold War-era mistrust and 
apprehension. Rhetoric from American industry groups like the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) and political leaders bears this 
out. In 2005, for instance, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) stated that, before 
he would vote on Russia‘s accession to the WTO, ―many of us will have to 
be convinced that the Russian government is serious about cracking down 
on theft of U.S. intellectual property.‖196 In addition to copyright claims, 
the United States contended that Russian law does not provide TRIPS-
consistent protection against unfair commercial use of test data and other 
data submitted to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products.
197
 The 2006 annual U.S. Trade 
Representative ―Section 301‖ report, for instance, refers to deficiencies 
which include: the ―lack of an effective and deterrent criminal 
enforcement system . . . ; the lack of effective plant inspection [for optical 
media production and distribution] . . . ; the lack of civil ex parte search 
procedures; an extremely porous border; delays in criminal prosecutions 
and adjudications; and infrequent destruction of seized pirate goods.‖198  
To overcome this impasse, in November 2006, United States and 
Russia signed a ―market access agreement‖ requiring Russia to take action 
to address piracy and make continuing law reforms before the Unites 
States would consent to Russia joining the WTO.
199
 In a side letter to the 
market access agreement, the United States singled out Russian optical 
 
 
 195. Michael Mertens, Thieves in Cyberspace: Examining Music Piracy and Copyright Law 
Deficiencies in Russia as it Enters the Digital Age, 14 U. MIAMI INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 143 
(2006); see also Russia loses WTO bid as G8 begins, 16 July, 2006, available at http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5183892.stm (describing Bush-Putin talks prior to G8 summit relating to 
enforcement of Russian laws against the piracy of American music, computer programs, and DVDs). 
 196. Bradley S. Butterfield, Kevin J. Mason, Joseph B. Payne, and Robert R. Trumble, Human 
Resources and Intellectual Property in a Global Outsourcing Environment: Focus on China, India, 
and Eastern Europe, 15 INT‘L H.R. J. 7 (2006).  
 197. 2005 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REPORT. 
 198. Id. at 32; Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 1 n.218 (2008).  
 199. Susan Butler, U.S. Labels Target Russian Music Site, BILLBOARD, Jan. 27, 2007, at 17; 
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET, RESULTS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 
RUSSIA‘S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Nov. 19, 2006). 
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media (CD, DVD, etc.) factories and Internet servers that manufactured or 
distributed foreign copyrighted works, calling on the Russian government 
to aggressively target these offenders.
200
 In exchange for Russia‘s 
agreement to step up enforcement and to streamline the passage of Part IV 
of the Civil Code, the United States promised to provide further training 
and advisory support for the Russian Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade.
201
  
Notwithstanding the market access agreement and assurances from 
Russian leaders, losses from IP infringement originating in Russia 
continue to rise. An annual report compiled by the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative pursuant to Section 182 of the U.S. Trade Act of 
1974 provides a glimpse into the alleged losses from copyright 
infringement in countries like Russia.
202
 In 2009 alone, the estimated 
losses from Russian piracy of business software were nearly $1.9 
billion.
203
 In sum, the American copyright industry estimates that it loses 
at minimum $2.5 billion dollars to Russian piracy each year. These figures 
do not include estimates for losses of records and music, motion pictures, 
entertainment software, and books. Consequently, the U.S. Trade 
Representative maintains Russia on its ―Priority Watch List.‖ By 
comparison, losses due to Chinese piracy (with its significantly larger 
population and computer and internet access rates) amount to $3.5 
billion.
204
  
 
 
 200. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. RUSSIA BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS 
AGREEMENT—SIDE LETTER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Nov. 19, 2006), available at 
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Russia_the_NIS/asset_upload_file1
48_10011.pdf; Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, U.S.-Russia, 
available at http://ustraderep.gov/Trade_Sectors/Intellectual_Property/Russia/Section_Index.html. 
 201. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. RUSSIA BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS 
AGREEMENT—SIDE LETTER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Nov. 19, 2006). 
 202. The ―Special 301‖ Report is an annual review of the global state of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection and enforcement, conducted by the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (enacted in 1994). 
See 19 U.S.C § 2101 (2006). 
 203. These statistics are compiled by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and 
incorporated into the Special 301 Report. See IIPA, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 126 (2010), http://www.iipa 
.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. By comparison, the 2008 losses from Russian piracy of 
business software were nearly $2.3 billion. Id. Globally, annual American losses due to IP violations 
amount to more than $100 billion, according to one U.S. trade group, the Coalition Against 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (headed by NBC VP Rick Cotton). See Darrell A. Hughes, NBC VP: US 
Needs Intellectual-Property Rights Protection Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, available at http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100218-714295.html.  
 204. Id. 
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2. Russian Civil Code (Part IV) and Legal Licenses 
The following section outlines several substantive provisions relating 
to legal licenses and fair use, and compares them with established 
American fair use standards to determine the extent of likely actual 
harmonization. The U.S. copyright law and fair use exemption are chosen 
as a functional equivalent
205
 because of the vast number of American cases 
interpreting and applying the fair use doctrine and the dominance of the 
U.S. approach in international IP regulation regimes. Copyright 
infringement claims in Russia and the United States also often arise from 
similar factual circumstances, especially in cases involving copyright 
infringement on the Internet.  
To begin, Article 1245 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (all 
subsequent article references are to the New Copyright Law) governs the 
reproduction of copyrighted works in the form of ―home copies‖—limited 
copies of copyrighted musical works for private use. Even ―home‖ 
reproduction of such musical works must be compensated. As before, 
copyrighted musical works are protected more strictly than other 
audiovisual electronic works, notwithstanding the fact that, currently, 
more and more books, academic materials, and other works containing 
scientific, artistic, photographic, or other non-musical works take the form 
of electronic, easily reproducible works. The distinction between musical 
and other audiovisual electronic works made in Article 1245 illustrates the 
ambiguity of the current scheme. Thus, the traditionally protected right to 
―home copy‖ musical works for personal archive needs is eliminated, 
while home reproduction of non-phonographic or non-musical works is 
allowed. Such ambiguities abound in the new law. 
For instance, Article 1266 protects authors‘ rights to prohibit 
alterations of their works.
206
 Pursuant to this law, the author‘s written 
permission is required to make any additions, alterations, deletions, 
provision of illustrations, to issue a preface, postscript, or add comments 
or explanations to a text. In short, all alterations of a work are prohibited 
without the author‘s express consent, save the separately preserved right 
for parodies and caricatures. Article 1266 marks a strong departure from 
the previous right against alteration. Currently, the author‘s right to his or 
her ―reputation‖ is invoked solely in instances where the alterations may 
have caused an infringement on the author‘s reputation or honor.  
 
 
 205. See Graziadei, supra note 4. 
 206. These rights are properly titled the rights of inviolability over a given copyrighted work 
(права на неприкосновенность произведения). 
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Similarly, Article 1273 provides for a limited ―private use‖ exemption. 
Pursuant to this Article, reenactment of a copyrighted work is permitted so 
long as it is strictly performed for private use.
207
 However, like Article 
1245 (Right to ―Home Copy‖), the private use exemption is ambiguous on 
its face. Applied to the Internet context, the implications of this provision 
become even more unclear. First, the term ―reenactment‖ 
(воспроизведение) does not clearly define a particular set of permissible 
rights or acts. Secondly, ―private use‖ is notoriously fuzzy when applied to 
the Internet. For instance, is posting a clip of copyrighted music on a 
private Internet message board so that the individual can enjoy clips of the 
music remotely considered private use, or is the fact that the music clip is 
reproduced and hosted on a remote server sufficient to constitute illegal 
reproduction? 
Article 1274 contains a limited ―cultural use‖ exemption.208 This 
section provides a legal license for free use of copyrighted material in 
―informational,‖ scientific, educational, or cultural contexts. Although the 
educational and cultural exemption seems broad, the exemption itself is 
subject to several very broad limitations. For instance, pursuant to Article 
1274 Section 2, libraries may lend electronic versions of copyrighted 
works (CDs, DVDs, VCR cassettes, e-books) only so long as the works 
are viewed in library facilities, under conditions making reproduction 
impossible. Immediately, such a limitation bans legitimate 
 
 
 207. See Статья 1273 (Свободное воспроизведение произведения в личных целях 
допускается без согласия автора или иного правообладателя и без выплаты вознаграждения 
воспроизведение гражданином исключительно в личных целях.) [Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1274 (Russ.) (allowing the free right of reproduction for private 
use without the permission of the author or the holder of author‘s rights and without compensation.)]. 
 208. Id. art. 1274 (allowing the free use of copyrighted works for informational, scientific, 
educational/teaching and cultural purposes). 
[. . .] 
2. В случае, когда библиотека предоставляет экземпляры произведений, правомерно 
введенные в гражданский оборот, во временное безвозмездное пользование, такое 
пользование допускается без согласия автора или иного правообладателя и без 
выплаты вознаграждения. При этом выраженные в цифровой форме экземпляры 
произведений, предоставляемые библиотеками во временное безвозмездное 
пользование, в том числе в порядке взаимного использования библиотечных ресурсов, 
могут предоставляться только в помещениях библиотек при условии исключения 
возможности создать копии этих произведений в цифровой форме.  
[2. When a library offers samples of works that have been legally introduced into public use, 
for temporary non-profit use, this use is allowed without the consent of the author, the holder 
of the author‘s rights, and without compensation. Electronic copies of works, including works 
introduced for reciprocal use of resources, may be lended only in the library facilities and 
under conditions prohibiting the possibility of creation [reproduction] of these works in 
digital form.]  
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educational/cultural uses of films and musical works in the home or 
classroom context. Clearly, the limitation on libraries‘ rights to lend cuts 
deeply into the educational and cultural prerogatives of the libraries, 
namely the free and reasonable dissemination of knowledge and literary 
and cultural works.
209
 Moreover, beyond restricting citizens‘ longstanding 
rights to fair, uncompensated use of copyrighted works via the libraries, 
the Article arguably infringes on legitimate, constitutionally-protected 
rights to access information, especially of those who are unable to travel or 
visit libraries.  
Article 1275 echoes the restrictive and outdated spirit of Article 1274. 
This Article grants libraries the right to reproduce one copy of a 
copyrighted work without compensation for purposes of archiving the 
given work. Like Article 1274, Article 1275 Section 2 contains a broad 
limitation prohibiting the reproduction or storage of reproduced works via 
electronic means.
210
 In other words, libraries may reproduce works via 
facsimile with the aid of any technical devices, so long as the devices do 
not yield electronic copies of the works.  
To put it mildly, the ―one analog copy‖ rule is a relic of an analog 
past.
211
 Moreover, this rule, far from enabling a vibrant multimedia 
academic atmosphere, stifles research by reducing legitimate fair 
electronic uses to paper reproductions.
212
 The practical effect of Articles 
 
 
 209. See Janice T. Pilch, Fair Use and Beyond: The Status of Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 65(6) COLL. RES. LIBR. 468, 468–504 (Nov. 
2004) (discussing the evolution of fair use in Russia between the 1995 and 2004 legislation). 
 210. See Статья 1275 (Свободное использование произведения путем репродуцирования) 
[Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1275 (Russ.). Free use of works 
using reproduction]. 
[. . .] 
2. Под репродуцированием (репрографическим воспроизведением) понимается 
факсимильное воспроизведение произведения с помощью любых технических средств, 
осуществляемое не в целях издания. Репродуцирование не включает воспроизведение 
произведения или хранение его копий в электронной (в том числе в цифровой), 
оптической или иной машиночитаемой форме, кроме случаев создания с помощью 
технических средств временных копий, предназначенных для осуществления 
репродуцирования. 
[2. Reproduction (reprographic reproduction) is understood to mean fascimile reproduction of 
a given work with the help of any technical device, aside from the initial production. 
Reproduction does not include reproduction or storage of copies in electronic (including 
digital), optical or other machine form, except in instances of creation with the aid of 
technical devices of temporary copies, for the purpose of reproduction.] 
 211. Pnina Shachaf and Ellen Rubenstein, A Comparative Analysis of Libraries’ Approaches to 
Copyright: Israel, Russia, and the U.S., 33:1 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 94 (2006). 
 212. For instance, Article 1275, Section 1, Subsection 2, provides that reproductions of excerpts of 
copyrighted works may be made upon request from private citizens, but also for educational/scientific 
uses. Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1274 (Russ.). This is a 
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1274 and 1275 read together is extremely restrictive. For example, schools 
are permitted to reproduce paper excerpts of given texts, but may not 
distribute identical excerpts in electronic form to students.  
Article 1276 codifies a limited ―public domain exemption.‖213 Pursuant 
to this provision, if an architectural or artistic object is in the public 
domain, reproductions may be made of it and distributed via airwaves or 
via electronic means. As with the foregoing limited copyright exemptions, 
the scope of this exemption in the Internet context remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, this provision offers substantive justification for an 
expanded conception of free licensed use on the Internet. Thus, 
photographs of copyrighted works which are found in public squares may 
be broadcast on the Internet. However, it is unclear whether reproductions 
of copyrighted works appearing in publicly accessible museums would fall 
within this exemption. As will be analyzed below, this positive provision 
should be interpreted to allow distribution of works in all public (i.e., 
public squares) and quasi-public (i.e., museums) domains via electronic 
means such as the Internet. 
3. Russian Legal Licenses v. U.S. ―Fair Use‖ & Berne Convention 
As shown above, the New Copyright Law seeks to bring Russian law 
in line with strict international copyright norms. Consistent with the Berne 
three-part test, the New Copyright Law provides only the most limited 
legal licenses or so called ―fair use‖ exemptions to copyright. The 
following section will compare the legal licenses afforded by Russian law 
with the right to ―fair use‖ embodied in U.S. copyright law.  
The ―fair use‖ exemption to the U.S. Copyright Act is codified in 17 
U.S.C. § 107.
214
 Section 107 also sets out four factors to be considered in 
determining whether or not a particular use is fair: 
 
 
subtle but drastic departure from the existing law which contains language seemingly allowing entire 
works to be reproduced for educational use.  
 213. Статья 1276. Свободное использование произведения, постоянно находящегося в 
месте, открытом для свободного посещения. [Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF] 
[Civil Code] art. 1276 (Russ.) (uncompensated use of likeness of work located in a public place)]. 
 214. ―[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The U.S. Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976, modified several aspects of 
U.S. copyright law to harmonize with the requirements of the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971) and 
entered into force on March 1, 1989. The Berne Implementation Act granted limited moral rights to 
authors of visual works within complex limits, but did not modify the ―fair use‖ regime.  
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.
215
  
All four of these factors require a court to look at the specific work at issue 
using a fact-based analysis of the copying in light of surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether infringement has occurred.
216
 As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has stated in one of its most recent copyright 
decisions: 
[T]he ―fair use‖ defense allows the public to use not only facts and 
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in 
certain circumstances. . . . The fair use defense affords considerable 
―latitude for scholarship and comment.‖217  
The scope of this ―considerable latitude‖ is varied in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the scope allows for a wide 
range of ostensibly permissible uses, with only the risk of post facto 
sanctions for copyright infringement. In other words, rather than providing 
a strict positive enactment of permissible uses, the U.S. copyright law 
establishes a flexible retroactive ―fair use‖ limitation.218 In over 150 years 
of common law litigation (prior to codification in 1976),
219
 this system has 
proven flexible, yet procedurally and substantively fair, by forcing 
plaintiffs to guard and enforce their rights.
220
 
 
 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 216. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) (stating that ―[fair use in 
copyright] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules,‖ but rather in ―case-by-case analysis‖ in which 
the four factors ―are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright‖); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 361–458 
(1985). 
 217. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 218. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A New Core International Copyright Norm: The 
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 219. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 was a comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act. It 
became effective on January 1, 1978.  
 220. Cf. David Nimmer, ―Fairest of them All‖ and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003) (describing inconsistency in applying the ―fair use‖ standard). 
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There are a number of practical consequences of this ―reverse‖ 
approach. First, it gives private individuals and educational or cultural 
institutions the right to independently assess their own conduct and 
develop unique policies for non-infringement, based on their own 
capacities for risk, litigation, etc. Thus, educational bodies such as 
universities may interpret the first factor in the ―fair use‖ test—whether 
the use is for a commercial purpose or a non-profit educational purpose—
rather broadly (perhaps as a dispositive factor), and opt to provide clearly 
copyrighted material to their students under the guise of ―fair use.‖221  
The Russian legal licenses provided in the New Copyright Law 
correspond to the ―fair use‖ standard found in U.S. copyright law. Major 
categories of historically protected use are respected in the New Russian 
Law. Thus, the major academic rights are adequately protected: the right 
to use excerpts of works in an academic setting; the right to create an 
archival reproduction of copyrighted works; the right to reproduce works 
for ―personal use.‖ In the traditional print and durable media context, these 
major rights are uncontroversial.  
Nevertheless, with respect to emerging technologies, the positive 
limited legal license approach seems unworkable on its face. For instance, 
one can imagine myriad legitimate educational uses of copyrighted 
musical or film works in the home or classroom settings. Accordingly, 
many U.S. libraries with flexible interpretations of the ―fair use‖ standard 
allow their borrowers to rent copyrighted musical works, videos, DVDs, 
and other media in furtherance of their educational and cultural missions. 
Of course, other U.S. libraries do not have faith in the purely educational 
motives of their patrons and restrict borrowing of these materials out of 
fear that the materials are being illegally reproduced.
222
 The important 
point, however, is that these libraries have an independent right to interpret 
their patrons‘ habits and devise policies which they feel adequately 
embody true ―fair use.‖ In other words, there is a freedom to make new 
technologies available, but the freedom imposes on libraries, and their 
borrowers, the responsibility to use the technologies in a responsible, 
copyright-friendly manner. Depending on their preference for risking 
copyright infringement lawsuits, libraries can adapt to completely new 
technologies (providing copyrighted works via electronic means to their 
 
 
 221. Indeed, this is the rationale employed by multiple major research universities in the United 
States (such as the University of Michigan) for allowing the Google Books project to scan, copy, and 
reproduce their entire collections.  
 222. I draw on my personal experiences with public, private, academic, and general use libraries 
in the United States and experiences with libraries in Russia.  
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patrons) or opt in favor of tried and true paper book lending models.
223
 As 
a result, new technologies are used in innovative and efficient ways, 
contributing to broader dissemination of the original copyrighted work in 
question.  
The new Russian model employs a completely different approach. For 
instance, by banning libraries from reproducing works in electronic form, 
Articles 1274 and 1275 reduce libraries to traditional book lending 
institutions. Not only are these acts unenforceable, but they unnecessarily 
inhibit innovation towards the development of more efficient library 
models.
224
 Likewise, the new acts seem to outlaw existing innovative 
technological library projects such as the Open Russian Electronic 
Library
225
 of the Russian State Library or the digitization efforts started by 
the Russian State Library in 1999 (ADAMANT project).
226
 Cases like 
ZAO Kommersant, Publishing House v. ZAO Public Library & OOO 
Vector Info will likely be resolved even more forcefully against private 
companies wishing to establish limited public access online libraries.
227
 
More generally, in the words of one commentator, ―fair use is a much 
more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of use than 
 
 
 223. For instance, the Cornell University library system (along with several other American Ivy 
League universities) currently allows patrons to request portions of copyrighted works to be 
electronically imaged and sent to the borrowers via e-mail. This benefit is intended to serve Cornell 
scholars residing away from the main Ithaca, NY campus. The borrower of course assumes the duty to 
use the work in ways consistent with U.S. copyright laws. 
 224. LENTA NEWS, Ostankino Court Found Lib.ru in Violation of the Rights of the Writer 
Gevorgyan, Mar. 31, 2005, http://lenta.ru/news/2005/03/31/lib/. 
 225. Откыртая русская электронная библиотека, http://orel.rsl.ru (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) 
(previously containing over 8,655 online books); see also National Electronic Library, http://rusnel 
.ru/index.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (providing free access to multiple current copyrighted literary 
works, e.g., ten of Boris Akunin‘s stories and plays). It should be noted that in its charter, the National 
Electronic Library requires member libraries and contributors to the electronic fund to be copyright 
holders or to act pursuant to the Law on Author‘s Rights and Neighboring Rights. See Charter of 
Russian Electronic Library, Section 1.1, Legal Basis, available at http://rusnel.ru/conception.htm. 
 226. The ADAMANT project was started in 1999 with the goal of digitizing (creating digital 
copies) the entire Russian State Library collection, over 40 million works. The ADAMANT project 
eventually evolved into the Open Russian Electronic Library and the National Electronic Library. See 
Creating an Information System for the Russian State. A pilot project Challenging IT, 66th IFLA 
Council and General Conference, http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/056-142e.htm (last visited Oct. 
25, 2011).  
 227. V.B. Naumov, LAW AND THE INTERNET: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 199–205 
(University Publishing House 2002). The case involved a private for-profit company that included 
copyrighted material in its paid library without the copyright holders‘ consent. The court applied the 
law on libraries to the private company, holding that the company did not have a right to use the 
content. The holding rested on several factors: (1) the access to the website was on a subscription or 
paid basis; (2) the publication on the Internet differed from traditional library uses in that it was 
permanent. A modern case involving similar ―embedded‖ content with a ―time-bomb‖ (file expires 
after certain time) would have probably passed the court‘s scrutiny under the current law. However, 
under the New Copyright Law, this act would probably constitute infringement.  
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purpose-specific exception, most of which are not technologically 
neutral.‖228 This is not to say that the current ―fair use‖ standard in 
American law is fully workable or applied consistently with respect to 
alleged Internet copyright violations. It is not. The only real advantage of 
the ―fair use‖ standard is its relative flexibility. Scholars know that they 
may use works ―fairly‖ and act ―fairly‖ according to their own meanings 
of what is ―fair.‖ One student standing at a Xerox® may copy five pages 
of a textbook and deem it fair; another may copy five books and deem it 
fair. Depending on the context, both instances may be legitimate fair use. 
The key is that it is not necessary to draw bright lines, to impose page 
limits on copies, or to restrict the modes of reproduction. Some students or 
professors may be caught copying books and be forced to pay 
compensation, but most will know they have a reasonable right to copy, 
and more importantly, will continue to copy.  
However, compared to the relatively flexible ―fair use‖ standard, which 
may be litigated following particular alleged copyright violations, the legal 
license approach works the opposite way. It seeks to enumerate specific 
rights that institutions have, but by doing so ambiguously, it stifles the 
institutions‘ rights to invent and experiment with novel teaching 
techniques and new technologies in the classroom, such as multi-media 
teaching and playing films in cultural centers.  
These problems are not unique to Russia. Nearly two decades of IP 
litigation in the United States has not produced a workable ―fair use‖ 
standard with respect to the copyright obligations of Internet service 
providers, Internet cataloguers, Internet encyclopedias, and so forth. 
However, it is perhaps the failure to produce a comprehensive catalog of 
Internet rights and liabilities which has contributed to the dramatic growth 
of the information technology (IT) sector, and the Internet in particular. As 
renowned Internet law expert Lawrence Lessig and others have argued, it 
was perhaps a boon to the IT industry and to American culture that many 
of the most popular Internet uses remained in legal limbo, or in the gray 
shadow of legitimacy in the first decade of the Information Age.
229
 Even 
today, the most important issues of copyright law, including the scope of 
the ―fair use‖ exemption, are being tested and reshaped by Google (e.g., 
Google Books) and numerous other Internet pioneers eager to stake 
legitimate legal claims to virgin Internet territory.
230
 Despite new 
 
 
 228. See Gervais, supra note 218, at 27. 
 229. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2006), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freecontent/. 
 230. For instance, the right of search engines to display portions of other websites was extensively 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
584 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:535 
 
 
 
 
legislation in the United States such as the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (heightening penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet), 
U.S. law remains uncertain with respect to key copyright issues. Not 
surprisingly, as the law remains uncertain, innovation continues. 
The Russian experience with Internet innovation has been equally if 
not more spectacular since the early 1990s, precisely because of a similar 
legal uncertainty regarding the status of the Internet. For this reason, sites 
like AllofMP3 sprung onto the international stage, gaining wide following. 
Russian Internet use surged and a vibrant and lucrative information 
technology sector was able to develop throughout Russia and the former 
Soviet Union, including smaller nations like Moldova. Immediately after 
its launch in 2000, AllofMP3 became embroiled in domestic lawsuits by 
international firms, including the RIAA. The disputes continued 
throughout the 2000s. Despite mounting international opposition, the legal 
theories being litigated before the local Moscow courts pointed to a 
growing appreciation among Russian jurists for American-style 
ambivalence in Internet law.
231
 Uncertainty in Russian law on non-
contractual licensing also seemed to encourage innovation in the sector 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.
232
 However, as shown above, in 
enacting the New Copyright Law, Russia sought to greatly limit traditional 
legal licenses and fair use exceptions, indeed in a far more restrictive 
manner than found in U.S. legislation.  
Similarly, along with enacting the New Copyright Law, from 2007, 
Russia also began an aggressive effort to implement and strictly enforce 
the letter of the new law. In June 2007, for instance, the popular file-
sharing site mentioned above, AllofMP3.ru, was shut down due to 
pressure from the Russian government. Not coincidentally, the lawsuit by 
 
 
debated within academic circles in the early years of the Internet, with the courts ultimately ruling that 
search engine displays were permissible fair uses. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2003) (inlined thumbnails in search engine results considered fair use since they did not 
undermine the copyright holder‘s potential market); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (echoing Kelly); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(content cached by search engines‘ crawlers did not violate fair use principles); see also Danny 
Sullivan, Google Book Search Wins Victory in German Challenge, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, June 28, 
2006, http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2058383/Google-Book-Search-Wins-Victory-In-German-
Challenge (noting that a German court advised against plaintiff‘s lawsuit against Google Book Search 
based on the theory that Google‘s display of portions of copyrighted work in Google Book Search 
engine was similar to search engines‘ display of result data). 
 231. On August 27, 2007, a Moscow district court ruled that AllofMP3.com operated within the 
law, http://www.allofmp3.ru/press.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 232. Budylin & Osipova, supra note 176, at 1. 
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the RIAA was dropped shortly thereafter.
233
 Since 2008, the New 
Copyright Law has also signaled the start of a new era in Russian Internet 
law, more broadly speaking, marked by increasingly detailed positive laws 
relating to property rights in non-traditional network media, Internet, and 
over products of intellectual activity concerning the Internet. Aside from 
an expected decrease in experimentation and innovation by information 
technology firms due to exposure to litigation risk, this new era is also 
marked by greater cooperation between Russia and Western firms in 
defense of these rights.  
The forecast for the immediate future of copyright in Russian Internet 
law seems filled with challenges. With the enactment of the New 
Copyright Law, Russia seems poised to take on an ambitious range of 
enforcement measures aimed at ―cleaning up‖ its Internet piracy problem, 
as well as its image with respect to copyright enforcement before the 
international community. The end result promises to be harmonization 
between Russian, EU, and broader international copyright law, all aimed 
at supporting Russia‘s accession to the WTO.234  
The more important question at this point is whether Russia will need 
to further amend its New Copyright Law to conform to WTO standards? 
At present, it is doubtful that further law reform will be necessary, as the 
current law seems to codify the existing Berne three-step test
235
 and is 
likely to be strictly applied in practice.
236
 Thus far, the scope of this three-
part test has not been delimited on the international plane, and application 
of the test has produced only general guidelines.
237
 Furthermore, Russia 
 
 
 233. Music Industry Drops Copyright Suit Against Russian Music Site, ALLFMP3 BLOGS (May 
26, 2008, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.allofmp3.ru/music_news/2008/05/26/music-industry-drops-copyright-
suit-against-russian-music-site/. 
 234. Cameron, supra note 190. 
 235. The Berne three-step test is a clause that has been included in several international treaties on 
copyright (notably the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the EU Copyright Directive, 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). It imposes constraints on the possible 
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights under national copyright laws. The most important 
version of the test is that included in Article 13 of TRIPS. It reads: ―Members shall confine limitations 
and exceptions to exclusive rights to [1] certain special cases which; [2] do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work; and [3] do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights 
holder.‖ TRIPS Agreement, supra note 175, art. 13. 
 236. Research has not produced a sufficient number of Russian cases interpreting the New 
Copyright Law. Therefore, the analysis regarding likely application in practice is based on firsthand 
empirical research and discussions with Russian IP attorneys and scholars.  
 237. See Gervais, supra note 218, at 14–19 (analyzing application of three-part test to US 
Copyright Act by 2001 WTO panel). 
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has recently acceded to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(―WIPO‖) Internet Treaties.238 
One can expect that in the near term Russia will seek to further restrict 
fair use exemptions, particularly in the Internet context. To promote 
enforcement, Russia may even experiment with new anti-piracy measures 
such as Internet trolls, restrictive firewalls, and similar measures currently 
used and being developed by governments like China to restrict Internet 
access. With a large, highly sophisticated pool of information technology 
specialists, Russia is particularly well-equipped to experiment with 
disastrous Internet monitoring measures under the guise of copyright 
enforcement. The threat of such measures for media and particularly 
Internet freedom in Russia cannot be understated, especially in light of 
Russia‘s historical experience with state censorship and restrictions on the 
flow of information.  
In sum, the New Copyright Law accomplishes exactly what its writers 
set out to do—it marks a complete break with the legacy of Soviet 
copyright policy that remained in the 1993 Law on Author‘s Rights (such 
as the broad academic/cultural use exemption) and harmonizes Russian 
law with existing international copyright norms. As has been argued 
elsewhere,
239
 instead of developing workable parameters for copyright 
exceptions for the Internet, or invoking new technologies that mitigate the 
threats against copyrights, or drawing a flexible line between copyrights 
and exceptions,
240
 the New Copyright Law can have the unintended 
consequence of chilling the exercise of free speech. As a result of the strict 
New Copyright Law and out of fear of litigation, companies, 
organizations, and individuals may be less likely to exercise their 
constitutionally protected speech and access to information rights not only 
in the Internet context, but also more generally. Subsequent waves of IP 
law reform in Russia will most likely attempt to delineate these previously 
ambiguous rights.  
 
 
 238. The WIPO Internet Treaties refers to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The WCT and the WPPT entered into force on March 
6, 2002, and May 20, 2002, respectively. See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO 
INTERNET TREATIES, available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/ecommerce/450/wipo_pub_ 
l450in.pdf. 
 239. Conference Presentation at Moscow State University, Faculty of Journalism: ―Fair Use‖ In 
Russia‘s New Internet Regulation Regime—A Law and Economics Perspective, Mass Information in 
Internet: Freedom and Responsibility (Oct. 12–13, 2007).  
 240. For instance, Digital Rights Management, or legal recognition of viable read-only 
alternatives to text versions of e-books (i.e., non-printable, non-copyable Adobe .pdf files—such as 
Антон Серго, ИНТЕРНЕТ И ПРАВО (2002), available at http://internet-law.ru/book/text/book_5.pdf). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] RUSSIAN IP REFORM 587 
 
 
 
 
But as concerns us here, the domestic IP sector reforms are also 
symptomatic of several broader developments in Russian international 
legal theory. First, just as in the Interwar period, the post-Soviet reforms 
signify a general willingness to conform to customary and evolving 
international norms. From the standpoint of Russian international lawyers, 
the domestic implementation of international norms aimed at delineating 
and defending private property rights seems to constitute a core function 
of public international law. As in the Interwar period, post-Soviet 
international jurists are fully aware that state relations are no longer 
confined to matters of war and peace, but increasingly encompass 
commercial concerns. In Russia, economic practices and firm activity are 
perceived as having an impact on Russia‘s image as a responsible 
economic actor. The image of a predictable economic actor is also 
bolstered by actions which demonstrate predictable state action, and vice 
versa. This means that, for now, Russia will continue its efforts to 
strengthen its IP regime, especially in high-profile copyright infringement 
cases.  
C. Policy Trade-Offs, Resistance, Values, and Interests  
The historical outline provided above suggests several normative 
lessons. First, and most significant, the WTO‘s continued opposition to 
Russia‘s accession has had the effect of forcing Russia to explore 
alternative economic integration arrangements, often along lines 
resembling the previous Soviet economic union.
241
 Russia‘s surprise 
announcement in July 2009 that it intended to accede to the WTO as a 
regional customs body along with Kazakhstan and Belarus (instead of as a 
state party) sent ripples of discontent in the international trade community. 
However, this resistance was to be expected. Russian international law 
discourse has been voicing discontent regarding the WTO accession 
process for at least the last five years.
242
 Leading Russian jurists involved 
 
 
 241. HIROSHI ODA, RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LAW (2d rev. ed., Nijhoff 2007). 
 242. Г.М. ВЕЛЬЯМИНОВ, МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ ПРАВО И ПРОЦЕСС § 588 
(Волтерс Клувер, 2004) (―Соответствующий договорно скрепленный синдром 
безответственности питает отчасти, наряду с прочими мотивами, и американское 
сопротивление формально давно назревшему приему России в ВТО, ибо в рамках этой 
организации придется отказаться от дискриминационной безответственности перед Россией.‖) 
[G.M. VELYAMINOV, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE § 588 (WaltersKluwer, 
2004) (―The corresponding and contractually binding syndrome of irresponsibility [regarding the U.S.-
Russian bilateral agreement absolving U.S. firms of liability in Russia] partially feeds into, along with 
other motives, the American opposition to Russia‘s accession to the WTO, which is formally long 
overdue. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to withdraw from the discriminatory treatment [of the 
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in the IP harmonization efforts, like Victor A. Dozortsev, genuinely hoped 
that their efforts would be rewarded with WTO accession and were 
surprised, if not outright offended,
243
 when the United States continued to 
stall Russia‘s integration efforts.244 For its part, the American lobby has 
raised legitimate concerns regarding the implementation of the New 
Copyright Law and related legislative enactments. Yet there is a palpable 
indignation among certain Russian jurists at the treatment Russian good-
faith efforts have received in the U.S. For instance, American demands 
that copyright violations be governed by criminal, rather than civil law, 
and that software programs carry copyright protection rather than patent 
protection, were extensively debated in the Russian working group, but 
ultimately rejected on policy grounds, such as the fact that no Western 
European state afforded such protections.
245
 
 
 
WTO].‖)]. Velyaminov, a professor of law and a chief researcher at the ISL, is one of Russia‘s leading 
experts on international economic and trade law.  
 243. Александр Л. Маковский, Американская История, 7(1) ВЕСТНИК ГРАЖДАНСКОГО 
ПРАВА 165–96 (2007) [Alexander L. Makovsky, American History, 7(1) VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO 
PRAVA 165–96 (2007)] (discussing the involvement of individual U.S. Senators during the 
development of Part IV, and personal dissatisfaction with their conduct); see Letter from Chuck E. 
Grassley & Max Baucus, U.S. Senators, to Peter F. Allgeier, Acting United States Trade 
Representative (Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with author), reproduced at http://finance.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/ranking/release/?id=ef71e567-f685-4b37-9203-2d56fca0e86a (letter concerning U.S. 
reservations about Russia‘s accession to WTO due to IP infringement). Alexander L. Makovsky (b. 
1930) is one of the leading civil law jurists in Russia and a renowned authority on intellectual property 
law. He was the deputy chair of the working group that developed Part IV. See also АЛЕКСАНДР Л. 
МАКОВСКИЙ, О КОДИФИКАЦИИ ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА (1922–2006) (М: Статут, 2009) [Alexander 
L. Makovsky, On the Codification of Civil Law (1922–2006) (Moscow: Statute 2009)]; А.Л. 
Маковский, Обращение к читателю, ВЕСТНИК ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА (―Создание нового 
российского гражданского законодательства еще не завершено. Далеко не все в уже принятых и 
действующих законах себя оправдало—это и многие «американизмы» в корпоративном праве и 
нормативных актах от инвестиционных ценных бумагах, и крайне противоречивое 
законодательство о некоммерческих организациях, и многое другое. Ряд крупных законов 
нуждается в продуманном совершенствовании. Не является в этом отношении исключением и 
Гражданский кодекс.‖) [Alexander L. Makovsky, Appeal to the Reader, VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO 
PRAVA, available at http://www.mvgp.ru/full_obr/ (―The creation of a new Russian civil code is not 
yet complete. By far not all of the adopted and active laws were vindicated [by history]—along with a 
number of ―Americanisms‖ in corporate law and normative acts on investments and negotiable 
instruments, and contradictory legislation on NGOs, and much else. A series of major laws is in need 
of measured reevaluation, not excluding the civil code.‖)]. 
 244. See generally ВИКТОР А. ДОЗОРЦЕВ, ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРАВА: ПОНЯТИЕ, СИСТЕМА, 
ЗАДАЧИ КОДИФИКАЦИИ (СБОРНИК СТАТЕЙ) (М.: Статут, 2005) [VICTOR A. DOZORTSEV, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CONCEPTION, SYSTEM AND PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION (COLLECTED 
ARTICLES) (Moscow: Statute 2005)]. Dozortsev (1928–2003) was one of the leading Russian jurists in 
the working group developing Part IV of the Civil Code.  
 245. Pleshanova, supra note 186. U.S. copyright law also provides mainly civil remedies, though 
the U.S. government may file criminal charges for any violation of the Copyright Act provided that 
such infringement is undertaken ―willfully‖ and ―for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). However, the United States has moved more aggressively 
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Second, U.S. insistence on further law reform—even after the passage 
of Part IV of the Civil Code—seems unlikely to resonate due to the U.S.‘s 
failure to deliver on its promises (most significantly, dropping opposition 
to WTO accession). For instance, in its 2009 ―Section 301‖ report, the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ―look[ed] to Russia to make 
further progress by ensuring that the Russian Customs Code, Civil Code 
and Law on Medicines comply with the Intellectual Property Rights 
(‗IPR‘) Bilateral Agreement and the relevant TRIPS Agreement 
obligations that will take effect upon Russia‘s accession to the WTO.‖246 
While these recommendations are certainly warranted, they are 
increasingly perceived by Russian elites as disingenuous.  
In contrast to the United States, the EU has been consistently in favor 
of Russian accession, notwithstanding Russia‘s evolving IP regime.247 
This may be reflected in the EU‘s own complex process of standardization 
in the realm of IP throughout the 1990s.
248
 The underlying rationale 
behind EU standardization in the IP domain is similar to any 
harmonization project.  
The underlying philosophy of standardization, to put ideas into the 
public domain, and the philosophy of intellectual property rights, to 
maintain ideas or expression as private properties, are inconsistent 
and that tensions between them could inhibit the rapid adoption of 
EU standards.
249
  
However, the EU proceeded with the understanding that actual de facto 
harmonization could only occur as the result of actual trade, contestation, 
and revision over a prolonged period of time following WTO accession.
250
 
 
 
towards criminalizing copyright infringement, particularly to fight piracy over the Internet. See, e.g., 
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
 246. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301
%20REPORT.pdf.  
 247. For EU-Russia trade issues related to Russia‘s accession to the WTO, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, 
The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 
32 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 345 (2006); Despite Obstacles, EU Expects Russia to Join WTO This Year, 12 
INT‘L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 23 (2008), available at http:// 
ictsd.org/i/news/bridgeweekly/12267/.  
 248. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, RONALD S. LAURIE & LAWRENCE E. ELDER, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE ¶ 12.5 (Prentice Hall 
Law & Business 1992). 
 249. Id. (citing European Commission, Communication on the Development of European 
Standardization—Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 1991 
(C 20) 1 [Green Paper], at 25). 
 250. See Backer, supra note 159, at 3–17 (suggesting that harmonization and convergence is 
primarily the result of, and in furtherance of, economic activity). 
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The EU‘s position on Russian intellectual property reform is informed by 
this pragmatic experience, and is borne out by the harmonization reforms 
in former socialist countries that have since joined the EU. The principal 
lesson of EU harmonization in the IP domain was that even as states adopt 
formal European Community directives, emerging technologies will 
continue to challenge traditional IP forms.
251
  
Third, while there is a dissenting isolationist strain in Russian foreign 
policy discourse,
252
 Russian leaders and elites are fully committed to the 
view that globalization is a good thing, and that further integration into the 
global trading regime is in Russia‘s long term interests. This thinking has 
been entirely consistent with the historical development of international 
law in the West
253
 and in Russia since the collapse of communism. The 
notion that individuals and firms have universal fundamental economic 
rights that transcend the wills of national rulers has strong resonance in 
contemporary Russia. As seen above, even during the early and later 
Soviet periods, the USSR subordinated its ideological rhetoric to more 
concrete economic realities. At the same time, Russian leaders are 
noticeably sensitive to what they perceive as American international trade 
gamesmanship, egoism,
254
 and imposition.
255
 Under Putin, Russia has 
closed nearly all outstanding international aid projects and reform 
initiatives.
256
 Furthermore, Russia has also started to reassess its reliance 
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on Western economic models in the wake of the financial crisis, although 
what tangible changes will result remains to be seen.
257
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite ascribing to a communist ideology and professing an 
exceptional ―socialist international law‖ in the domain of international 
intellectual property law (specifically, copyright law), the Soviet Union 
has consistently worked to harmonize its domestic law with general 
developments in international law. This has been done to facilitate trade in 
material and intellectual property with Western powers. Soviet 
international law scholars reconciled legal harmonization with communist 
principles by employing a number of novel rhetorical and argumentative 
structures, such as: (1) the transition theory to justify temporary 
concessions and compromises; (2) international legal instrumentalism to 
justify the ends over the means; and (3) de-politicization of substantive 
international law matters to make intellectual property protection a matter 
of administrative international law, and hence not subject to theoretical 
contestation with the West. 
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has implemented at least four 
major law reform projects in the IP domain (1993, 1994, 2004, 2008) to 
further harmonize domestic law with emerging international norms. The 
latest round of reforms is intended to be a definitive domestic codification 
of Russia‘s outstanding international obligations in the realm of 
intellectual property. In anticipation of, and in furtherance of, WTO 
accession, Russia has harmonized its domestic legislation with all 
outstanding TRIPS obligations, including the WIPO Internet Treaties. 
Comparative analysis of Russian copyright law with U.S. ―fair use‖ 
standards reveals Russian copyright law to be at least as stringent as its 
U.S. counterpart.  
The WTO‘s continued refusal to permit Russian accession is based, in 
part, on Russia‘s lax enforcement of IP protections. Considering that 
Russia has coordinated its formal domestic legislation with international 
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norms, it is unclear how long Russia must wait to demonstrate acceptable 
levels of enforcement. This ambiguous position has generated resentment 
among leading Russian policy-makers and jurists. This is likely to hinder 
future reform projects, spawn further resistance to WTO-mandated 
reforms, and interrupt the organic legal harmonization efforts underway in 
Russia. 
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